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Abstract The article examines a fundamental problem in classical Jaina philos-
ophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the hylozoistic and at the
same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of particular interest in view
of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of venerating bone relics and stu¯pas
of prominent saints. The main argument proposed in this article is, that, from a
classical doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for
Jainas, if at all, because of their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed
presence of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on
relic worship across cultures. The specific focus of the article are Jaina and non-
Jaina explanations of the qualities of special matter in terms of karmic and natural
processes of transformation.
Keywords Ascetic body  Power  Sacred matter  Relics  Stūpas  Jaina karman 
theory  Theory of parin:āma  Theory of multiple causation  Principle of the 
excluded third  do-kiriyā-vāya  terāsiyā-vāya  cattara-bham:gā
This article is dedicated to Karel Werner. The research was in part funded by Arts and Humanities
Research Council (AHRC) Fellowship AH/I002405/1. I am indebted to Acarya S´ubhacandra, and
Muni Padmacandra (Jaymalgacch), and Acarya Sunlsagara, Muni Amodhakrti, and Muni
Amarakrti (Digambara Acarya Adisagara A _nkalkara Parampara) for their explanations of details
of Jaina karman theory; and to Lance Cousins, Padmanabh S. Jaini, Kristi Wiley and J. Clifford
Wright for their insightful comments on earlier versions of the text.
Sacred Matter: Reflections on the Relationship
of Karmic and Natural Causality in Jaina Philosophy 
Peter Flügel
(SOAS)
This article is about heresy (mithyātva).1 It examines a fundamental problem in 
classical Jaina philosophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the 
hylozoistic and at the same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of 
particular interest in view of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of ven-
erating bone relics (asthi) and stu¯ pas of prominent saints.2 Of the eight early 
doctrinal schisms (pravacana-nihnava)3 in the Niggantha (Jaina/Jain) tradition,
mentioned in the S´veta¯mbara texts T: ha¯n: a1 7.140–142
4 and Uvava¯iya (Uv1) 160, and
described in A¯vassayanijjutti5 (A¯vN1) 778–788 and its commentaries,
6 two will be
of significance for the main argument proposed in this article, that, from a classical
doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for Jainas, if
at all, because of their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed presence
of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on relic
1 Prakrit (Pk.) micchatta. In the Prakrit texts, the short form dit:t:hi is often used, from miccha¯-dit:t:hi,
(someone who holds a) wrong-view. Sometimes also miccha¯ is used (Jaini 2007, p. 165). In the canon,
non-Jaina heresies are discussed in particular in the Su¯yagad: a (Su¯y.), in the Viya¯hapannatti (Bhagavaı¯)
(Viy.) and in form of a list of Bra¯hman: ical texts, in the Nam: dı¯ (NS1,2) 67 ¼ NS3 77. See Schrader (1902),
Folkert (1993), Ohira (1994, pp. 162–164), and Bolle´e (1999, 2006). Folkert (1993, p. 296f.), compiled a
comprehensive list of terms for heretics in the Su¯yagad: a, labelled ‘‘non-Jainas’’, and pointed out that
‘‘[t]wo sorts of mithya¯dars´ana are postulated, one that is inborn and one that comes from others’
teachings’’ (ib., p. 295).
2 Pk. pavayan: a-nin: hava. For details, see Flu¨gel (2008, 2010b). ‘‘Sacred matter’’ is in the following used
as an observer’s gloss for ‘‘dead-’’ or ‘‘insentient matter’’ associated with the bodies of Jaina ascetics. See
Jaini (1985, p. 90): ‘‘Only ascetics . . . are truly auspicious’’.
3 Also Pk. nin: haga, nin: haya. Sk. nihnava.
4 The T: ha¯n: a is a quasi-encyclopaedic canonical (siddha¯nta) S´veta¯mbara text.
5 On the composite structure and history of the A¯vN, an important S´veta¯mbara text going back to the 1st
century C.E., traditionally attributed to Bha¯drabahu II, whose canonical status is disputed because it was
compiled much later, see Leumann (1934, p. 28). The present article focuses mainly on S´veta¯mbara
sources. However, a brief survey of Digambara texts points to evidence for similar conceptions. See infra
the discussion of SaSi1 357 for example.
6 Leumann (1885, 91ff., 1934, p. 46) refers to the following early Prakrit sources: T: ha¯n: a1 7.140–142 (list
of names of the officially seven schisms, founders, places) and in prose Viy. 9.33 (the first schism of
Jama¯li; a text dated by Ohira (1994, p. 148) to the fifth century); Non-canonical: in verse A¯vas´yaka
8.56–100 (additional dates of origin, narration of reasons, and final observations) ¼ A¯vN1 778–788 and
anonymous Mu¯labha¯s:ya 126–148; Jinabhadra’s sixth to seventh century Visesa¯vassayabha¯sa (ViA¯vB) III
& IV and in Jaina Ma¯ha¯ra¯s: t:rı¯ Prakrit and Sanskrit prose Haribhadra’s eighth century A¯vas´yakavr: tti (or
t:ı¯ka¯) (A¯vV) in A¯vN1 II, pp. 312–328. Leumann’s (1885, p. 97) review of the sources does not refer to the
A¯vassayacun: n: i (A¯vC) which has been attributed to A¯ca¯rya Jinada¯sagan: i Mahattara (593–693 C.E.) and
Uttarajjha¯yan: anijjutti (UttN) 165–178. See Balbir (1993, pp. 67, 146) on parallels in Hemacandra’s
twelfth century Tris:as: t:is´ala¯ka¯purus:acaritra (TS´PC) 10.8.28–108 (Johnson 1931–1962 VI, pp. 193–198).
The A¯vN mentions not only the seven heresies but also (according to Leumann 1885, p. 92 with help of
interpolations) the more recent heresy of the Bot:ikas (Digambaras) which alone led to a sectarian schism
persisting until today. Only the first and the eighth schism in particular attracted further attention in the
academic literature. On the heresy of Jama¯li, see Deleu (1970), Bronkhorst (2003), Dundas (2006). The
rebirth prospects of the seven nihnava-ka¯riyas, who are after all reborn in heaven, are outlined in Uv1
160. Leumann’s 1885 German rendition of the A¯vN passage relies on the text transmitted in the com-
mentary of S´a¯ntisu¯ri.
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worship across cultures.7 The two early schisms are the fifth and the sixth, which,
according to the A¯vN, took place 228 and 544 years after Vaddhama¯n: a
‘‘Maha¯vı¯ra’s’’ death. According to S. Ohira’s (1994, p. 227f.) reconstruction of the
history of ideas in early Jainism, the debated philosophical questions emerged in the
middle and late-canonical periods, sometime between the first century B.C.E. and
the fourth century C.E. Her account broadly matches the traditional dates if the
nirva¯n: a date of Vaddhama¯n: a is brought forward to 395 B.C.E., as proposed by K.R.
Norman (1991/1993, p. 201).8
The heretical ideology attributed to Ajja9 Ga _nga, who is said to have caused the
fifth schism, is known as the ‘‘doctrine of two actions’’ (do-kiriya¯-va¯ya).10 In the
A¯vas´yakavr: tti, a commentary on the A¯vassayanijjutti composed by A¯ca¯rya Hari-
bhadra in the eighth century in mixed Prakrit and Sanskrit prose, the following
information is given.11 Ajja Ga _nga lived in the town Ullaga¯tı¯ra at the river Ullaga¯.
His guru Dhan: agutta lived on the other side of the river. To venerate his teacher,
Ajja Ga _nga once waded in the autumn midday heat through the cool waters to reach
the other side of the river. Because of the simultaneous sensation of the cold water
and of the hot sun, he remembered the teaching of the scriptures, that ‘‘only one
sensation can be experienced at the same time, either a cold or a hot sensation’’,12
which seemed to contradict his experience. He discussed the matter with Dhan: ag-
utta, who simply dismissed his doubts, and was subsequently forced to leave the
order, because was not prepared to change his mind. Sometime after his expulsion,
Ga _nga was however reconverted by the polite snake god Na¯ga of Ra¯yagiha, who
angrily threatened him with death, because of his deviation from Vaddhama¯n: a’s
beloved teaching. No explanation of the reasons for the reconversion is given.
7 See Oldenberg (1894/1917: 586, n. 1) for the Vedic conception ‘‘daß in den Gebeinen der Tote
gegenwa¨rtig ist [that the deceased is present in the bones]’’, and attempts to protect the bones from the
cremation fire by covering the corpse with body-parts of a cow (ib., p. 577). For a review, see Flu¨gel
(2010b, pp. 468–482). The fact that in practice many Jains have different attitudes (see for instance the
ceremonial ‘eye-opening’ on Jina statues in the image-worshipping traditions) is not a philosophical but
an anthropological issue.
8 According to the S´veta¯mbara tradition, Vaddhama¯n: a lived 599–527 B.C.E. The Digambars settled for
587–510 B.C.E.
9 S. a¯rya, venerable. In the following the original Prakrit is used.
10 Sk. dvi-kriya¯-va¯da, but in the literature since Haribhadra’s A¯vN 780 (‘‘ga _nga¯t dvaikriya¯h: ’’) generally:
dvaikriya-va¯da.
11 Supplementary to A¯vN1 780, Mu¯labha¯s:ya 133–134, p. 317. The do-kiriya¯ doctrine is also discussed in
the universally accepted parts of the canon (without mentioning the name Ga _nga), in Viy1 1.9.3 (98a),
1.10.2 (106a), 2.5.1 (131a), 5.3.1 (214a), 6.10.3 (285b). Bhatt (1983, pp. 113, 111) placed it in the second
of three main textual layers and Ohira (1994, p. 227) located the underlying ‘‘kriya¯-vedana¯ problem’’
(experience of the fruition of karman) of the first three texts in the third to fourth of her scheme of
canonical stages (1st century B.C.E.–4th century C.E.) and the last three texts in the fourth to fifth (4th
century C.E.).
12 sutte bhan: iyam: jaha¯ ega¯ kiriya¯ vedijjai – sı¯ta¯ usin: a¯ va¯ (A¯vV 134).
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Maybe Ga _nga realised, after all, that feelings of love and hate cannot coexist at the
same time.13
The sixth schism, the heresy of Chalu(g)a, is briefly listed in T: ha¯n: a1 7.141 and in
A¯vN1 780. According to Haribhadra’s commentary on Mu¯labha¯s:ya 140, he was the
author of the Vaisesiyasutta (Vais´es: ikasu¯tra) (elsewhere know as Kan: a¯da)
14 and the
first to propose the ‘‘doctrine of the triad’’ (tera¯siya¯-va¯ya).15 In contrast to the other
13 The Digambara mystic Kundakunda, who has been placed by most scholars in the second century
C.E., refuted the dokiriya¯ doctrine in chapter three of his Samayasa¯ra vv. 85–86:
jadi poggalakammamin: am: kuvvadi tam: ceva vedayadi a¯da¯ |
dokiriya¯va¯dittam: pasajadi so jin: a¯vamadam: ||85||
jaha¯ du attabha¯vam: poggalabha¯vam: ca dovi kuvvam: ti |
ten: a du miccha¯dit:t:hı¯ dokiriya¯va¯din: o hom: ti ||86||
85. If the A¯tma¯ or Self produces these Karmic materials (operating as upada¯na¯ karta¯ or substantive
cause) and enjoys the consequences thereof in the same manner, it will lead to the doctrine of a single
cause producing two different effects, which will be in conflict with the Jaina faith.
86. Because they make the modifications of Self as well as modifications of matter to be effects of the
same identical A¯tma¯ or the Self (operating as upa¯da¯na cause) the believers in that doctrine of causation
(which derives the conflicting effects from the same source), are said to be of erroneous faith’’ (English
rendition by Chakravarti, in SS, p. 73f.).
On this passage, and others, see Upadhye (1935, p. xlviii), who restated that both the S´veta¯mbara
and the Digambara traditions reject ‘‘the tenent that the soul can be the agent of its psychic states and also
of karmic modifications’’. Chakravarti (1950/1989), in SS: 73f., pointed out that Kundakunda invoked the
two-truth theory for making the point that from the conventional point of view the soul is the cause of its
own karmas, but not from the transcendental point of view, because of the strict Jaina dualism. Cf.
Johnson (1995, p. 260f).
Ma¯lvan: iya¯ (1971, p. 418) summarised Malayagiri’s commentary on the question of the possibility of
simultaneous hot-cold feeling which is also mentioned in the canonical P 36, saying that ‘‘though the
concerened cognitions take place alternately, their alternation being quick and speedy is not noticed by
us; and from this standpoint only the Su¯tra considers the cognitions of hotness and coldness to be
simultaneous’’.
14 Jacobi (1895, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii) argued that ‘‘Ro^hagupta did not invent, but only adopted the
Vaiseˆshika philosophy to support his schismatic views’’. He etymologically linked Kan: a¯da, ‘‘crow-eater,
owl’’, whose system was nicknamed ‘‘Aulu^kya Darsana’’, with ‘‘Ro^hagupta’s second name, Khuluya’’,
which seems to allude to ulu¯ka,’’owl’’, hence (implausibly) furnishing Sk. S: ad: ulu¯ka, ‘‘six owl’’, for
Chalu(g)a, as suggested already by Haribhadra (A¯vN 780) and echoed by all Prakrit dictionaries.
15 Sk. trira¯s´ı¯-va¯da, but in the literature since Haribhadra’s A¯vN 780 (‘‘s:ad: ulu¯ka¯t traira¯s´ika¯-na¯mutpat-
tih: ’’) generally: traira¯s´ika-va¯da, ‘‘doctrine of the three heaps or categories’’. A school of this name is also
mentioned in the Nam: dı¯ (NS4) 77 (No.12) & 104 (No. 7), but without reference to Rohagutta. The
equivalent passages of NS4 77, NS1 72 and NS2,3 67, refer to vesiyam: instead of tesiyam: and tera¯siam: ,
and the equivalent passages of NS4 104–NS1 106f., NS2,3 101f., refer to tigun: am: as ‘‘tera¯siya¯im: ’’ rather
than to keubhu¯am: . Pun: yavijaya, Ma¯lvan: iya¯ and Bhojak (1968, pp. 107–109) have discussed the textual
history of the ‘‘corrupt reading tesiyam: ’’ and rarely (apparently following the edition of Sa¯gara¯nandasu¯ri)
tera¯siyam: instead of vesiyam: , which they interpret as ‘‘vais´es: ikam’’. They come to the conclusion that the
Stha¯nakava¯sı¯ editions by Hastı¯mal and by Gha¯sı¯la¯l are responsible for the view that both passages (not
just the second) refer to the A¯jı¯vikas:
The term vesiya was turned into tesiya by the copyist reading ta instead of va; then tesiyam:
became tera¯siyam: ; afterwards this tera¯siyam: got equated with traira¯s´ika; and at last on the basis of
the commentary on su¯tra 107 it was written that by this term (su¯tra 72 [1]) the commentator
[Malayagiri] means [the] A¯jı¯vika school founded by Gos´a¯laka [rather than the Tera¯siya school]
(ib., p. 108f.).
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Nigganthas, who favoured the ontological dyad of life (jı¯va) and non-life (ajı¯va), he
posited three rather than two fundamental categories of reality: life (jı¯va), non-life
(ajı¯va), and quasi-life (nojı¯va).16 The third category designates either an interme-
diary or mixed state of entities that appear to be temporarily both alive and not-
alive, or an ontological entity that is neither jı¯va nor ajı¯va.17 While the first inter-
pretation was favoured by Leumann (1885, p. 123) and Mehta and Chandra (1970 II,
p. 646), the second interpretation is chosen here.18 In the more detailed accounts in
Mu¯labha¯s:ya 135–140
19 and Haribhadra’s commentary, the schism is labelled
‘‘heresy of Rohagutta’’, a monk who in later Jaina literature is identified with
Chaluga.20 Rohagutta once felt the need to challenge a knowledgeable wandering
ascetic commonly known as Pot:t:asa¯la (‘‘Belly-Tree’’
21 or ‘‘Drum-Stick’’), who was
so full of himself that he girded himself with a copper wire, lest his dress would
burst because of the abundance of his knowledge, and carried a branch of the Jambu
tree (jam: bu-d: a¯lam: ) to indicate that on this Jambu island, at the centre of the middle
world, no-one could match his scholarship. The debate was held at the court of king
16 Leumann (1885, p. 118, n. 8) translated nojı¯va¯ ambiguously as ‘‘halblebende’’ or ‘‘half-living’’ beings:
‘‘no hat im Gegensatz zu a in Composition nicht privativen, sondern prohibitiven Sinn, und so bezeichnet
noj^iva^ Wesen, die obwohl eigentlich j^ıva, nicht dazu gerechnet werden du¨rfen, sei es nun wegen
Verstu¨mmelung oder anderer Ursachen’’. In modern Jaina commentaries no- is usually translated as
‘‘quasi-’’, which is somewhat equivocal. Monier-Williams (1899/1986, p. 571) states that Sanskrit no
stands ‘‘in later language’’ for na, ‘‘not’’. Pischel (1900/1999, § 170, p. 151) points to cases where Prakrit
no is the result of na undergoing sandhi with the initial vowel of the next word, which could lend support
to the interpretation no-ajıva, ‘‘not-non-life’’, or rather no-jıvajıva, ‘‘not-life-non-life’’, that is ‘‘neither
life nor non-life’’, as the intended meaning. Set:h (1928/1986, p. 422) explains nojıva in general terms as
either an ‘‘insubstantial’’ third category that is different from jıva and ajıva, or as a synonym of ajıva or of
nirjıva. In his commentary, Haribhadra ( AvN1 II: 320) refers to the the ‘‘four points of view’’ of Jaina
logic, the cattara-bham: ga, which Leumann (1885, p. 123 n. 1) interprets as a ‘‘later phase of the doctrine
of the triad’’: ‘‘in der eigentlichen Erza¨hlung vom Schism war … noch keine Hindeutung darauf vor-
handen, dass auch den noj^ıva^ eine Negation gegenu¨bergestellt werden sollte’’. Hence, according to
Leumann, Rohagutta must have favoured the third perspective of the tetras-doctrine (‘‘both-and’’) rather
than the fourth (‘‘neither-nor’’). In favour of his interpretation speaks that, even in early texts, the fourth
alternative is generally acceptable in Jaina logic and should not have caused a controversy on logical
grounds (see Flu¨gel 2010a, pp. 155–180). Yet, it would certainly have been controversial if interpreted
ontologically as a third fundamental substance. Notably, apart from jıva all other astikayas are treated as
sub-categories of ajıva. See footnote 18.
17 Mehta and Chandra (1970 I, p. 347) mention a doctrine, also labelled tera¯siya, which was in the Jaina
commentaries attributed to the A¯jı¯viya (Sk. A¯jı¯vika) Gosa¯la, who apparently believed ‘‘that there are
three states of souls, viz., bound, liberated and redefiled (after liberation)’’ (citing Nandisu¯tracu¯rn: i p. 73;
Nandisu¯travr: tti of Haribhadra, p. 87; Nandisu¯travr: tti of Malayagiri, p. 239; Samava¯ya¯ _ngavr: tti of Abha-
yadeva, pp. 42, 130; Su¯trakr: ta¯ _ngavr: tti of S´ı¯la¯ _nka, p. 393). See footnote 15.
In a different context, Jaini (1979, p. 97) identifies another ‘‘third category’’: Sk. aru¯pi-ajı¯va,
referring to the substances (dravya) space, time, movement, rest which have neither form nor life.
Technically, however, it is a sub-category of ajı¯va and not a third category. See Glasenapp (1925,
p. 152). See infra. For the same see also P. S. Jain (1999, p. 31)
18 I am grateful to J. C. Wright for convincing me of the plausibility of the no’jı¯va¯ ¼ no-jı¯va¯jı¯va¯, ‘‘neither
jı¯va nor ajı¯va’’, interpretation. For the same see also P.S. Jain (1999: 31).
19 A¯vN1 Mu¯labha¯s:ya 135–140, pp. 317–322. For further textual sources, see Mehta and Chandra (1970
II, p. 481).
20 For instance by Muni Nathmal (¼ A¯ca¯rya Maha¯prajn˜a) in his Hindı¯ commentary on T: ha¯n: a1 7.140–142
(p. 781).
21 Leumann (1885, p. 117): ‘‘Kleid-Ast’’.
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Balasiri of Am: taram: jiya¯. Because Pot:t:asa¯la anticipated Rohagutta’s arguments in
favour of the Jaina dyad of jı¯va and ajı¯va, he argued the Jaina case himself, and
thereby forced Rohagutta to defend the triad of jı¯va, ajı¯va and nojı¯va.22 The contest
was finally won by Rohagutta, not through argument, but through the magical power
of his rayaharan: a, the whisk brush used by the itinerant monk or nun to gently
remove small living beings away from their path, which is the main insignium of the
Jaina ascetics. Prior to the contest, the rayaharan: a had been charged with mantras
by his preceptor Sirigutta, who was aware of the seven magical powers which
Pot:t:asa¯la was known to employ in debates whose argument he had lost. Sirigutta
therefore gave Rohagutta seven forms of counter magic. When Pot:t:asa¯la’s seventh
form of magic, the mockingbird magic, was defeated with the ‘‘ula¯va’’ counter
magic, Pot:t:asa¯la, in desperation, sent a she-ass. But he was beaten back with the
rayaharan: a. After his victory Rohagutta continued to favour the tera¯siya doctrine.
According to Haribhadra, he even composed the Vais´es: ikasu¯tra, a text whose
decisive influence on the formation of classical Jaina atomism was explained in this
way as a Jaina creation. Finally, he was defeated in a public debate in the royal court
by his old teacher Sirigutta, who finally simply asked him to go to the market (which
Jaina monks should not do) and to bring him living, dead and quasi-living things.
When Rohagutta requested for quasi-living things he was only presented with dead
objects.23
The morale of both stories is of course that Vaddhama¯n: a was right. There should
be no conceptual confusion of the fundamental ontological dualism informing his
teachings, especially not in the context of epistemology and logic.24 Although at
first sight the heresies of Ga _nga and Rohagutta appear to be entirely different
(associated with A¯jı¯vika25 and Vais´es: ika philosophies), both featured ‘‘category
mistakes’’ and by elevating ambiguity from a vice to a virtue threatened the very
22 A¯vN1 II: 319f. (Commentary to Mu¯labha¯s:ya 138): ‘‘do ra¯sı¯, tam: jaha¯ – jı¯va¯ ya ajı¯va¯ ya,… tinni ra¯sı¯
t:haviya¯ – jı¯va¯ ajı¯va¯ nojı¯va¯, tattha jı¯va¯ sam: sa¯rattha¯, ajı¯va¯ ghad: a¯di, nojı¯va¯ ghiroliya¯chinnapuccha¯ı¯, …’’.
Following this passage, the classical example of ‘‘neither life nor non-life’’ in Jaina texts is the tail of a
lizard which still moves for a while even after having been severed from the body.
23 A¯vN1 II: 319: ‘‘a¯n: eha jı¯ve ajı¯ve nojı¯ve ya, ta¯he devaya¯e jiva¯ ajı¯va¯ ya din: n: a¯, nojı¯va¯ natthi, evam-a¯di-
coya¯lasaen: am: puccha¯n: am: niggahio.
24 See Flu¨gel (2010, p. 155–162) on the Jaina critique of ‘‘partially true speech’’ (sacca-mosa¯-bha¯sa¯),
including category mistakes.
25 See Viy. V.3 and ViyBh 5.57–58. Basham (1951, pp. 175–181, 274f.) cites the relevant S´veta¯mbara
t:ı¯ka¯s on the Su¯yagad: a by S´ı¯la¯ _nka, on the Nam: dı¯ by Haribhadra and Malayagiri, and the vr: tti on the
Samava¯ya by Abhayadeva which either identify the A¯jı¯vikas with the Jaina trira¯s´ı¯va¯dins (like Hoernle
1908, p. 262) or describe them as another example of a sect propagating this doctrine. A similar position,
held by the Buddhist Ra¯jagiriyas and Siddhatthikas who in contrast to the Therava¯dins argued that an act
such as a gift can have an effect here and elsewhere, is documented in the Katha¯vatthu (KV) VII.6.
McDermott (1975, p. 431) noted that the argument was used to bolster the disputed doctrine of ‘‘merit
transfer’’.
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foundation of the teachings attributed to Maha¯vı¯ra in the classical canonical texts.26
Another inference the reader/hearer is invited to draw is that dialectics and magical
power may win arguments in scholastic debates, but will not buy real things in the
markets.
Ascetic Power and Karman
The extraordinary powers of Jaina ascetics, and of their relics, are attested by
numerous Jaina sources. Particular prominence was given to them in texts from
the middle and late canonical periods onwards, at a time when the Jaina men-
dicants faced strong competition from Buddhist and Bra¯hman: ical opponents and
classical Jaina doctrine was systematised.27 The following investigation draws
mainly on the Viya¯hapannatti (Viy.), the ‘‘Exposition of Explanations’’, the largest
and most unsystematic text of the S´veta¯mbara canon, compiled over a period of
about six hundred years, in which ‘‘Jaina theoreticians’’ seemed to have ‘‘freely
experimented to formulate novel ideas’’ (Ohira 1994, p. 232). Many of these ideas
are labelled ‘‘heretical’’ (annautthiya)28 in the text and the commentaries, and
demonstrated to be incompatible with Maha¯vı¯ra’s teaching. Others were assimi-
lated by Jaina philosophy at a later stage. In Deleu’s (1987–1988, p. 178) analysis,
the annautthiya-texts ‘‘form the backbone of the Viy.’’ Most of the heresies are
not named. An exception is the heresy of Jama¯li, the first of the seven early
schisms. Variants of the dokiriya¯ doctrine are also discussed, but A¯rya Ga _nga is
nowhere mentioned.
According to classical Jaina ontology and mythology, formulated in the later
accretions of the Viya¯hapannatti, and in the secondary pannatti texts as well as other
late- or post-canonical scriptures,29 ascetic powers, id: d: hi,
30 laddhi, siddhi, and
26 Ohira (1994, p. 237) argued that the main thrust of this period of theorisation (middle and late
canonical period, especially third Vallabhı¯ council) was ‘‘was to proclaim and authorize that the doctrine
of jı¯va-ajı¯va constitutes the cardinal doctrinal system for all the Jainas’’. However, she emphasized that
ideas of many ‘‘heresies’’ were later incorporated and distinguishes between two types of ninhavas: those
who present a clear cut Jaina position and those (like the fifth and the sixth) which do not (ib., p. 164).
27 Ohira (1994, pp. 98, 161f.) places all classical texts detailing the miraculous power of ascetics in the
4th–5th century C.E. See supra.
28 Sk. anyatı¯rthika.
29 On seconday pannatti-texts, see Schubring (1926, p. 10) and Deleu (1970, p. 31). The main systematic
text of classical Jainism is Uma¯sva¯ti’s Sanskrit Tattva¯rthasu¯tra (TS), usually dated fourth century C.E. In
parts it builds on earlier segments of the Viy.
30 Deleu (1987–1988, p. 173f.) argued that there is ‘‘a studied logical sequence’’ connecting the dispersed
id: d: hi texts associated with gods Viy. II.8 (Camara), X.6 (Sakka), XVI.9 (Bali), XVII.5 (I¯sa¯n: a), and
associated with the logapa¯las of Sakka and I¯sa¯n: a III.7–8, IV.1–8, and on the wives and abodes of
different types of gods X.5, XIX.7. According to him (and Bhatt and Ohira), the key ontological sections
(uddesa), which will be discussed in this article, are also late accretions: II.10, XIII.4, XI.10 (atthika¯ya,
loga, etc.), VIII.1 (poggala-parin: a¯ma), VIII.9 (bandha).
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physical strength (bala),31 are generated by sustained austerities (tava), whose
positive effects32 are encoded and stored in distinct sets (pagad: i) of karmic particles
(kamma-poggala) of varying subtleness (suhuma).33 The atomistic notion of karmic
matter was an innnovation at the time.34 It differentiates classical from early vol-
untaristic Jaina karman theories.35 Like the seeds of a plant, a karman-particle
embodies action in potentia (satta¯).36 This potential comes to fruition either natu-
rally (udaya),37 under specific conditions and within a karmically determined
time frame,38 or by being ripened prematurely (udı¯ran: a¯) through deliberate
31 See Flu¨gel (Forthcoming a) on Jaina concepts of power. The cited terms are the labels used by the lists
of ascetic powers in the texts themselves. More terms for power, such as pabha¯va (S. prabha¯va), will be
introduced at specific junctures of the following discussion. Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 138f., 142f., II:
255 n. 346) points to the resemblance with ‘‘the wonder-powers (r:ddhiprabheda¯h: ) which are enumerated
by older Buddhism’’ and Yoga literature; stressing that in ‘‘Jain understanding, the individual steps of
meditation are connected with the attainment of the different wonder-powers (r: iddhih: , P. id: d: hi)’’ as in
Buddhist (ib. I, p. 142) and possibly older Brahmanical views (ib. I, p. 204), including the theory of
ascetically produced secondary spirit bodies (ib. I, p. 142).
32 In later Jaina literature, asceticism is said to have two effects: it destroys accumulated karman (nirjara¯)
and it reduces demerit (pa¯pa) and generates merit (pun: ya), that is, meritorious karman which consists of
refined karmic particles, through a variety of karmic processes.
33 Viy3 1.19, cf. Viy1 1.4 (24b uses the opposition fine (an: u) and gross (ba¯yara).
34 However, there are precursors and parallel developments in Bra¯hman: ical philosophy (Potter 1980,
2001, p. 235 on karma¯s´aya) and literature (Dundas 2002, p. 290, n. 25) and parallels in contemporary
(Tamil) folklore (Daniel 1987, p. 212). Cf. Flu¨gel (Forthcoming b).
35 On voluntaristic or teleological karman theories, see Bronkhorst (2000). On the contrast between
voluntaristic and system-theories of karman, see Flu¨gel (2008) on L.C. Jain’s work.
36 See Schubring (1935/2000 § 85, p. 176) on the earlier term a¯ba¯ha¯ (Sk. a¯ba¯dha¯), literally pain or
oppressive trouble.
37 Cf. Potter’s (1964, p. 44) analogy between the principle of karman and quasi naturalistic habits.
Cf. also Bourdieu (1980/1992), who did not cross-reference the concept karman to his theory of habitus.
38 Classical (S´veta¯mbara) Jaina karman theory distinguishes four basic attributes of karman:
1. effect (prakr: ti),
2. duration (sthiti),
3. intensity (rasa or anubha¯va), and
4. quantity (of space units) (prades´a).
Modes of prakr: ti are:
(a) bondage (of certain types of karman) (bandha),
(b) latent / potential (existence of karman) (satta¯), and
(c) realisation (udaya):
(i) premature fruition (udı¯ran: a¯), and
(ii) transformation of one type of karman into another (sam: krama).
The principal modes of sthiti and rasa are:
(a) quantitative enlargement (apavartana¯), and
(b) reduction (udvartana¯).
These processes are largely depending on the intensity of the passions (kas: a¯ya). Determinism is prevented
by positing mechanisms of qualitative transformation of the effects of karman, such as the transformation
of one type of karman into another (sam: krama), and automatic (self) transformation (parin: a¯ma) through
asceticism. See Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 28–39).
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ascetic exertions,39 in mind, speech and body.40 The doctrine of karman can thus be
interpreted as a theory of power. Karmic particles encode specific qualities and
potentialities of action (karman). Yet, they are not the source of karmic power. The
specific potential stored in karmic particles is said to be predicated on the innate
infinite energy (vı¯riya) of the soul (jı¯va),41 which the karmic process (particle-
action) channels into specific forms and hence limits and perverts at the same
time.42
In Viy1 1.3.5 (56b) ¼ Viy3,4,8 1.3.144 energy is said to be produced by the
body which in turn is produced by the soul (the sequence of causality is: jı¯va>
sarı¯ra>vı¯riya>joa>pama¯da>kam: kha¯-mohan: ijja-kamma; soul>body>energy>activ-
39 On karan: a, the instrumental forces of the embodied soul, mind, speech, body and karman (man: a-
karan: e, vai-karan: e, ka¯ya-karan: e, kamma-karan: e), see Viy3 6.1.5, cf. Viy1 6.1.2 (251b).
40 The process, here starting with the transformation of already attracted and bound matter, has been
summarised already in one of the oldest mnemonic verses of the Viy. following Viy3 1.18:
parin: aya ‘ciya¯ uvaciya¯’, udı¯riya veiya¯ ya nijjı¯n: n: a¯ |
ekkekkammi padammi, cauvviha¯ poggala¯ hom: ti ||
There are four queries concerning each of the following expressions related to matter:
transformed [parin: amai], stored up [cinai], profusely stored up [uvacin: ai], prematurely
brought to rise [udı¯rei], experienced [veei], and worn off [nijjarei]
(Viy8 1.18 Sam: gahan: ı¯ Ga¯ha¯ 1, cf. Viy1 1.1.3 [23a]).
See Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 19, 28–39) and Schubring (1935/2000, §§ 84–86) on the difference
between udaya (not mentioned in the ga¯tha¯) und udı¯ran: a¯, with added historical notes.
Discussions on similar concepts in Buddhism are recorded in the Katha¯vatthu (KV). See McDermott
(1975, p. 430, etc.) In the Bra¯hman: ical tradition, the Pu¯rvamı¯ma¯m: sa¯ concept of apu¯rva, impersonal
‘‘potency’’, and the Vais´es: ika concept of adr:s: t:a, the ‘‘invisible’’ cosmic force relating to karman, were
somewhat similarly proposed to explain storable causal potencies which attach to the agent of an (sac-
rificial) action (kriya¯), and hence account for the efficacy and power of sacrifices, as Halbfass (1992,
p. 298ff). showed. He emphasized that ‘‘adr:s: t:a seems to function primarily as a principle of physicalistic,
naturalistic explanation, and its ethical and soteriological implications remain at least very obscure’’ (ib.,
p. 315). On the influence of the concept of adr:s: t:a on the Jaina concepts of dharma and adharma,
condition of movement and rest, see Ohira (1994, p. 105f.).
41 See Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 45) on vı¯rya (Pk. vı¯riya) as an ‘‘innate’’ quality of the soul:
The soul has vı¯rya energy’ ‘infinite capacities of activity’. This innate quality manifests
itself only if the jı¯va is free from all karman-matter. As long as the vı¯rya-antara¯ya-k is
operating, the vı¯rya is, although not completely eliminated, nevertheless exceedingly
restricted. It does not manifest itself spontaneously, as is the case with released souls, but it
is bound to matter. It needs an organ as ‘accompanying cause’ (sahaka¯rika¯ran: a), in order to
be able to act; it needs the medium of the body, the organ of speech and manas, in order to
manifest itself. This form of vı¯rya, bound to matter, is called yoga (activity) (ib.).
Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 19), Schubring (1935/2000, § 83, p. 172) and Deleu (1970, p. 84) (on Viy1 1.8
[94a–b]) interpreted vı¯riya predominately as ‘will’ or ‘will-power’. Attributes of the innate will-power
(purus: a¯rtha) of the soul are detailed in Viy1 1.3.5 (56b) = Viy3,4,8 1.3.146 in form of a list of terms
designating kindred qualities, ‘‘synonyms’’ according to Schubring, which in T: ha¯n: a1 1.44 are said to
become manifest only one at a time: ut:t:ha¯n: a, kamma, ba¯la, vı¯riya, purisakka¯ra-parakkama (impetus,
action, physical strength, mental energy, self-exertion, capacity of accomplishment). According to the
Nam: dı¯cun: n: i 104, the power (vı¯riya) of inanimate entities was apparently a topic of the ‘‘lost’’ third Pu¯rva
(Tulsı¯ & Maha¯prajn˜a 2009, p. 316). Viy1 1.4.2 (63b) distinguishes the wise and foolish use of power. See
also Utt1 28.11. See further Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 200, 209f.) on the peculiar active nature of souls in
Jainism.
42 On the process of channelling infinite into limited power, see Tatia’s (1994, p. 151) summary of
Uma¯sva¯tı¯’s autocommentary and Pu¯jyapa¯da’s commentary on TS1 6.1.–2.
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ity>carelessness>karman of view-deluding inclination). Yet, in the commentaries
such as ViyVr: 1.3.146 and in T: ha¯n: a1 1.44 it is interpreted as an attribute of the soul.
In order to solve the conundrum, inactive (akaran: a) and active (sakaran: a) forms of
energy, associated with soul and body respectively, were distinguished
(ViyVr:1.3.143f., cf. ViyBh 1.3.140-146). Hence, vı¯riya is not merely conceived as
presupposition of a particular action, but as a homogenous meta-quality,43 pre-
supposed by all actions.44 Not only does it energise, but also transforms, suppresses
and destroys all forms of karman that inhibit the soul’s path towards self-liberation
(mokkha-magga). The efficacy of the path of purification through processes of
refinement and depletion of karman depends on the degree to which the power-
obstructing karman (vı¯riya-am: tara¯ya-kamma) is suppressed and removed. Sup-
pression (uvasama), destruction (khava), and transformation of one karman into
another (sam: kama) are the elementary purging mechanisms that can be wilfully
activated by the soul45 through ascetic practice,46 including meditation. Together
with consciousness (uvaoga), the main quality of the soul, vı¯rya represents the
quality of free will47 which distinguishes Jaina karman theory from deterministic
interpretations of karman, such as the A¯jı¯vika doctrine or S´a _nkara’s insistence on
God as the latent source of karmic power.48 Vı¯rya is therefore often translated as
‘‘will-power’’. It is only because of will-power that the ascetic is able to perform
austerities to eliminate karman (path of liberation) and to transforms gross into
subtle karman (path of purification).49 A peculiar aspect of the Jaina (and Buddhist)
theory of karmic power is that power and purity of an individual are not opposites,
as in comparable Hindu conceptions, but two sides of the same coin, as indicated by
Dumont (1980, pp. 215f., 300) and Tambiah (1977, p. 43). Through asceticism,
43 Jaini (1979, p. 105f.).
44 The compound vı¯riya-laddhi, for instance, designates embodied power, not vı¯riya as such. Cf. Viy5
3.6.
45 The soul itself is seen as active in Jaina philosophy. See for instance Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 45). In
contrast to Sa¯m: khya philosophy, for instance, Jaina teaching is therefore referred to as kriya¯va¯da in the
canon:
Of one’s own accord one makes [karman] effective (udı¯rei) and one repents (garahai),
checks (sam: varai), suppresses (uvasa¯mei), experiences (veei) an annihilates (nijjarei) it by
an effort of one’s own will (vı¯riya) (Viy1 1.3.6 [56b], rendered into English by Deleu 1970,
p. 78).
However, Viy1 14.10 (657a) and P 22 explicitly state that, in contrast to the still embodied kevalin, the
siddha, or liberated soul, does not act, it is anut:t:ha¯n: a (S. anus: t:ha¯na or anuttha¯na), because it has no will
or energy. See Deleu (1970, p. 213).
46 This does not mean that an exact prediction of the result of an act of asceticism can be given by a non-
omniscient being: ‘‘It may well be said that the connections between action and result which Jainas set
forth often have a rather arbitrary feelingabout them’’ (Jaini 1979, p. 116).
47 See Viy1 2.10.c (149a).
48 On S´a _nkara’s interpretation in his S´a _nkarabha¯s:ya, on Brahmasu¯tra 3.2.38–41, see Sikdar (1987, p. 97).
49 Tabulations of on-to-one correlations between ascetic actions and karmic consequences (which would
be hard to justify) do not exist. It is thought that both consequences are produced at the same time by
asceticism.
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karmic potential is purified and strengthened at the same time. These processes of
transformation work both on the physical and mental plane and also at the level of
unconscious or automatic actions. The texts explain, for instance, that the natural
fruition (udaya) of karman manifests itself in painful physical as well as mental
experiences (veyan: a¯) of karman. According to Ohira (1994, p. 195), referring to
Viy. 1.2 and 16.2, this shows that ‘‘[u]daya and vedana¯ express the same phe-
nomenon by the different agents, i.e. karma and the [embodied] soul’’.50
Power as a generalised potential to act is thus conceptualised as a combination of
universal and specific qualities, of free will or raw energy of the embodied soul
conditioned by karmic constraints. ‘Raw power’ is, as it were, domesticated by the
two-tiered symbolism of this model, which constitutes karman as a system. In
system-theoretical terms it is stabilised by a ‘double-coding’ of the concept of
potentiality as vı¯rya and as latent karman, that is, as the potential to act in general
and in particular form.51 If one of the two components of karmically encoded power
is removed, the potential to act disappears. The pure or liberated soul, thought to be
active in itself, cannot act in the material world,52 because it is disembodied and
without a specific intentional object outside itself, and karmic particles disconnected
50 Compare the Buddhist debates on kamma-vipa¯ka, in KV VIII.9 for instance; and Halbfass (1991/1992,
p. 299) on S´a _nkara’s Advaita Veda¯nta, where ‘‘duh: kha and sukha themselves have objective as well as
subjective implications’’.
51 Cf. Luhmann (1975/1979, pp. 34–36/129f). On the method and social function of double-coded binary
oppositions as generalised symbolical media, see Luhmann (1975/1979, pp. 31ff./27ff.), and infra.
Notably, vı¯rya and karman do not represent ‘two ideals’ of power in Jainism (cf. Cort 1991a). An
interesting question for future research is the investigation of different forms of secondary or tertiary
coding in Jaina sectarian traditions.
52 This applies already to the last stage of embodied existence before the liberation of an omniscient
being: ‘‘The holy man has then become an a-yogi-kevalin, and possesses henceforth, into all eternity, the
infinite vı¯rya, bound to no organ, completely withdrawn from the influence of matter’’ (Glasenapp 1915/
1942, p. 46). The ‘‘undifferentiated cognition and the [material] power of the jı¯va has disappeared’’ (ib.,
p. 90).
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from an external source of energy cannot perpetuate themselves and disintegrate
into particles of inanimate matter.53
Objectified Ascetic Power
The special status of Jaina ascetics, explained by classical karman theory, is
highlighted in Jaina narrative literature by the fact that in their case alone even body
parts that are ‘‘out of place’’,54 and usually create aversion,55 are praised for their
attractive properties. The late- and post-canonical scriptures abound in lists and
stories praising the astonishing qualities not only of living Jaina ascetics, but also of
their body secretions and mortal remains, especially their hair, nails and bones,
which do not quickly decompose, and of their objects of use.56 Benefitting others
are the eight powers of healing (osahi-laddhi/id: d: hi), through ascetic touch, phlegm,
secretions such as mucus and sweat, waste matter from the tongue, lip, teeth, nose
and ear, urine and excrement, and everything that was in contact with the body of
53 There are subtle variations of the Jaina causal theory of power/action. Note the interpretation of ‘‘dual
causality’’ in Digambara mysticism: A¯ca¯rya Kundakunda’s SS 69–84, especially vv. 83–84 (only from
the conventional point of view does it appear as if the soul causes transformations in poggala-kamma; tr.
Schubring (1957, pp. 356–358); and the Laghutattvasphot:a (LTS) of the tenth century A¯ca¯rya Amr: tac-
andra, which builds on the work of Kundakunda (generally dated second century C.E.). In the words of
the editor and translator Jaini (1978/2000):
Cause’ is the designation for a complex situation; it involves self and other, i.e. of both
material (upa¯da¯na) and efficient (nimitta) causes, which operate in mutual dependence (ib.,
p. 64).
Being a ‘material’ cause is the prerogative of the substance alone; that is, the substance
(dravya) in one mode (parya¯ya) is the material ‘cause’ of the substance in its subsequent
mode, which is thus the ‘effect’. There can be neither an addition to nor a subtraction from
this innate power of the substance, the power to modify itself in accordance with its
potential or ‘upa¯da¯na’, regardless of the presence or absence of instrumental (nimitta)
causes. The Jaina therefore maintains that when the material cause (upa¯da¯na-ka¯ran: a) is
present, instrumental causes (nimitta-ka¯ran: as) will automatically appear; in other words,
whatever conditions are present will function as nimitta-ka¯ran: a at the appropriate time. …
Thus it appears that statements such as ‘bondage of the soul is caused by (dravya-)
karma’, or ‘the formation of the dravya-karma is brought about by the kas: a¯yas (passions) of
the soul’ are purely conventional (vyavaha¯ra) ones (ib., p. 48f.).
In a personal communication of 12.11.2011, P. S. Jaini added: ‘‘Karma is insentient and has no control
over nimitta-ka¯ran: a: the latter is subject to the conditions of dravya, ks:etra, ka¯la and bha¯va, in contrast to
the conception of the theists who consider Him to be able to kartum, akartum, anyatha¯ kartum, etc.’’
54 Douglas (1966/1970, pp. 12, 53, cf. 148f).
55 Pk. viigim: cha¯/vitigiccha¯, Sk. vicikitsa¯.
56 Strong (2004, p. 72, n. 1) cites an unpublished paper of Swearer reporting on ‘‘the Buddha’s excrement
and his snot, enshrined in different sanctuaries in Northern Thailand’’. In his own analysis, he shows that
excretions and hair and nails were treated as ambiguous objects in the Buddhist tradition, sometimes
classified as contact relics and sometimes as body relics. However, KV1,2 XVIII.4 states the contrary
Therava¯da view vis-a`-vis Buddhist heretics. See footnote 73. See Granoff (2008, p. 65, etc.) on similar
examples from Vedic and Hindu literature.
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Jaina ascetics (water, wind, hair, nails), as well as their poison-removing words and
sight.57 To this category also belongs speech, whose sound waves are in P 260b ff.
said to be formed by material atoms ejected in form of a thunderbolt (vajja-
sam: t:hiya). These atoms are ‘‘unconscious (acitta) and inanimate (ajı¯va), but yet are
inherent in souls’’ (Schubring 1935/2000, § 61, p. 137).58 The utterances of the saint
can be either poison-removing (vayan: a-n: ivvisa) or poisonous (a¯sı¯-visa) if indeed
used as a curse.59 With the exception of the power of touch (a¯mosa), the powers of
healing are not associated with living ascetics60 but with their secretions and
excretions and with the objects touched by them, that is, with physical matter which
is technically dead, though as it were containing the ‘‘congealed labour’’ of the
saman: a.
61 Current religious practice also shows that the body parts and the para-
phernalia used exclusively by Jaina ascetics are treated as embodiments of ascetic
energy. These objects are categorised as not just any form of matter, but as matter of
a particularly pure and hence powerful62 and desirable nature. It is believed that
their innate energy can be transferred by mere touch.
57 In the S´veta¯mbara canon, Uvava¯iya (Uv1) 24, Panha¯1 6.1.6 and A¯vN 68-70 list five powers (Pk. laddhi,
Sk. labdhi) of healing: 1. khela (Sk. kapha), 2. jalla (Sk. mala), 3. vippusa (S. viprus:a), drop of urine (and
faeces), 4. a¯mosa (Sk. a¯mr: s´a), 5. savva (S. sarva) (Panha¯ has No. 4 as No. 1). The S´veta¯mbara A¯ca¯rya
Hemacandra, in his twelfth century Yogas´a¯stra (YS´) 1.8, mentions seven powers of healing: kapha,
viprus:a, jalla, mala, vis: t:a¯, a¯mr: s´a and sarva (he additionally distinguishes jalla and mala and adds vis: t:a¯).
The corresponding Digambara list does not use the term laddhi but the term id:d: hi (Sk. r:ddhi). The list
of eight osahi-id:d: his (Sk. aus:adhi-r:ddhi) is given in A¯ca¯rya Yativr:sabha’s c. 5th century Tiloyapan: n: attı¯
(TP1) II.4.1078–1087:
1. touch (Pk. a¯mosa, Sk. a¯mars´a/a¯mr: s´a),
2. phlegm (Pk. khela, Sk. kapha or ‘‘ks:ela’’ ¼ s´les:ma),
3. secretions such as sweat and mucus (jalla),
4. waste matter (from the tongue, lip, teeth, nose and ear) (mala),
5. excreta (urine and excrement) (vis:a),
6. everything (that was in contact with the ascetic body) (Pk. savva, Sk. sarva),
7. poison-removing words (Pk. vayan: a-n: ivvisa, Sk. vacana-nirvis:a),
8. poison-removing sight (Pk. dit:t:hi-n: ivvisa, Sk. dr:s: t:i-nirvis:a).
In this list, no further differentiation of vis:a is offered. Instead two somewhat different items (no. 7–8)
are added. For a discussion of a similar list in Vı¯rasena’s ninth century commentary on the
S: at:khan: d: a¯gama of Pus:padanta and Bhu¯tabali, see Wiley (2012, pp. 156–8). Patan˜jali, in his Yogasu¯tra
(YS) III, lists many superhuman powers acquired through yoga, but not the power of healing.
58 See P 260b ff. summarised by Schubring (1935/2000, p.§§ 61, 68f.). For a discussion of Schubring’s
implicit theory of the Jaina doctrine of influence qua karmic binding, see Flu¨gel (2010a, p. 130f.).
59 See TP1 II.4.1088–1098 for instance.
60 In the same way as the auto-commentary on TS1 10.7, which also mentions the healing powers of the
body secretions of the most advanced Jaina ascetics, A¯ryika¯ Vis´uddhamatı¯ emphasized in her com-
mentary on TP1 II.4.1086, that this power results from tapas which is difficult to accomplish. It is
associated in particular with tapasvin/ı¯s, monks and nuns specialised in long fasts: jis r:ddhi ke prabha¯v se
dus:kar tap se yukta muniyom: dva¯ra¯ spars´a kiya¯ hua¯ jal evam: va¯yu tatha¯ rom aur nack a¯di vya¯dhi ke
haraneva¯le hı¯ ja¯te haim: , vah sarvaus:adhi na¯mak r:ddhi hai.
61 Jain (1947, p. 227) in his discussion of passages mentioning curing by touch, however, points to the
role of spells and charms and the help of gods (rather than powerful matter) in the ascetics’ exercise of
magical powers.
62 The constitutive opposition of purity and power, posited by Dumont (1966/1980) for Hinduism, has
been transcended by Jaina and Buddhist systems.
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The belief in the power (here: labdhi) of dissociated body particles of Jaina
ascetics is unmistakable in the following passage of Hemacandra’s twelfth century
Jaina universal history, the Tris:as: t:is´ala¯kapurus:acaritra (TS´PC) translated by
H. Johnson (1931–1962) as ‘‘The Lives of the 63 Illustrious Persons’’:
By the power of their yoga all the magic powers [labdhi], phlegm, etc.,
became apparent like mountain herbs by moonlight. The body of a leper, if
rubbed with just a particle of their phlegm, became golden like a heap of
copper from kotivedha juice. The impurities from their eyes, ears, etc., and
from their limbs, having the fragrance of musk, were a medicine for all sick
people. Merely from touching their bodies, sick people became well, as if
from a bath of nectar. Water, both rain-water and running water of rivers, etc.,
that had been in contact with their bodies, removed all diseases, as the light of
the sun destroys darkness. The bad effects of poison, etc., disappeared from
wind that touches their bodies, just as other elephants disappear because of the
scent of the ichor of a rutting elephant. Food, etc., infected with poison that
was placed in their dishes or mouths, became free from poison like pieces of
nectar. By hearing their speech, pain left any one afflicted with a very poi-
sonous disease, as poison disappears by a syllable of a charm. The nails, hair,
teeth, and every thing else produced by their bodies became medicines, just
as water in pearl-oysters becomes pearls (TS´PC 1. 843–855, translated by
Johnson 1931 I, pp. 75–77).63
The contemporary Stha¯nakava¯sı¯ monk Amar Muni pointed to divergent opinions
between those who believe that the body parts of Jaina ascetics are themselves
powerful, and others who assert that the will of the ascetic alone endows them with
energy.64 The question is pertinent in the context of the assessment of the powers of
healing (aus:adhi-r:ddhi). In his explanation of the canonical text Uvava¯iya (Uv2)
24b–c, Amar Muni refers to a passage in Jinada¯sagan: i Mahattara’s seventh century
A¯vas´yakacu¯rn: i (A¯vC)
65 which insists that the aus:adhi-r:ddhis ‘‘are effective only
when the ascetic wishes and resolves to use them for the benefit of others’’ (p. 64).66
A different view is expressed, for instance, in Siddhasenasu¯ri67 twelfth century
63 Similar potencies are evident in the Hindu traditions. On the ‘‘impersonal potency’’ of healing
attributed to the touch of ‘‘royal sages’’ (ra¯jars: i), see Gonda (1956, p. 45); and Parry (1982, p. 96) on the
‘‘miraculous medicinal potencies’’ of the bodily emissions of Aghorı¯ ascetics, for instance.
64 In line with the second interpretation, Uv3 24b–c defines the powers of Jaina ascetics not as id: d:his but
as laddhis, or attainments, that is, not as intrinsic qualities or properties of a living being, but as
consequences of specific austerities, some of which are detailed in Uv3 24c. These powers can apparently
be conveyed at will upon material atoms disregarding their locating inside or outside the body.
65 On dates and author, see Balbir (1993, p. 81).
66 The untraced text in ‘‘A¯vC I’’ is cited in Amar Muni’s Hindı¯ commentary, also referred to by Wiley
(2012, p. 154):
a¯mosahipatta¯n: am: roga¯bhibhu¯tam: atta¯n: am: param: va¯ javevi tigiccha¯mı¯ |
ti sam: citteu¯n: a a¯surati te takkhan: a¯ ceva vavagayaroga¯tam: kam: karoti ||
(cited in Uv2, p. 64).
67 There are three Siddhasenas mentioned in this article: Siddhasenadiva¯kara (c. 7th century), Siddh-
asenagan: in (c. 9th Century) and Siddhasenasu¯ri (12th century) who belonged to the succession of Ab-
hayadevasu¯ri of the Candragaccha/Ra¯jagaccha. The last two are S´veta¯mbara. The first is claimed to be
Ya¯panı¯ya by Upadhye (1974/1983, p. 200) and Jaini (1978/2000, p. 59).
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Tattvabodhavika¯s´inı¯ (TJV) 270–271, a commentary (vr: tti) on Nemicandrasu¯ri’s
eleventh century Pravacanasa¯roddha¯ra (PS) 270–271, which stresses the intrinsic
healing powers of detached body parts of Jaina ascetics.68
In part six of the TS´PC, bone relics (asthi) of the Jinas are also described as
having ‘‘power’’ (prabha¯va) (TS´PC1 6.565) and conveying ‘‘good fortune’’
(kalya¯n: a) (TS´PC1 13.269). The conundrum, how this can be understood in the
context of Jaina teachings will be addressed in the remainder of this text.
The Question of the Power of Relics
In which ways can material objects such as bone relics be conceptualised in Jaina
philosophical terms as repositories of transmittable living energy of a deceased
living being? The standard approach, both scholastic and academic, is to simply
dismiss relic practices as delusional forms of ‘popular religion’ or ‘magical think-
ing’ that deviate from the true teaching of the Jina. Another approach is to accept
‘folk theories’ on the metaphysical presence of the powers of the deceased in the
relics at face value without seeking an explanation. By contrast, the main argument
of the present article, that in the Jaina doctrinal context bone relics are treated as
sacred objects because of their specific material rather than metaphysical qualities,
is based on the assumption that relics are conceptualised by participants in the same
way as other dissociated body parts of Jaina ascetics, despite the fact that they are
not included in the standard aus:adhi- or other r:ddhi/labdhi lists. The ritual treatment
of the dead body of an ascetic, or of parts thereof, as powerful sacred matter,
described in the narrative portions of the canon69 and in recent ethnography70, is
also predicated, one would assume, on the implicit presupposition that it is com-
posed of particularly refined karmically produced particles which turn from ani-
mated into inanimated matter after being disconnected from the soul, and that the
energy stored in these unique particles can somehow be transmitted by physical
contiguity, even after death and cremation. Yet, this is rarely, if ever, explicitly
68 ‘‘As is stated in Avashyaka Churni 1 – A shraman endowed with Amarshaushadi labdhi can
cure a person or himself by his touch only when he resolved – ‘I wish to cure him.’ As long
as he does not resolve thus this power does not become effective as a cure. However, in
many scriptures there are mentions of instances where the smell or touch of the excreta of
such accomplished ascetics naturally cure many diseases. More details on this subject are
available in the commentaries (Tika and Vyakhya) of Dvar 271 of Pravacanasaroddhar
(Amar Muni in Uv3, p. 64, translated by S. Bothara)’’.
69 Jaini (1985, p. 89).
70 Flu¨gel (2008, 2010b, 2011).
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discussed in the texts, certainly not in karman theoretical terms71, nor is relic
worship a highly rationalised Jaina religious practice, for instance in terms of quasi-
contractual forms of merit transfer. The question, how disembodied ascetic power is
(or could be) conceptualised in Jaina philosophy is thus, to some extent, an exercise
in philosophical speculation, although it will in the following be investigated with
reference to relevant Jaina philosophical debates and contemporary Jaina practices.
The question, how the power attributed to relics and other detached body parts of
Jaina ascetics can be understood from the point of view of Jaina doctrine has never
been raised in the academic literature.72 Significant is what Jaina scholasticism has
to say about this issue.73 We will find that late canonical Jaina scriptures such as the
Viya¯hapannatti and its commentaries, maybe only these texts, offer ways of
understanding materially embodied ascetic power in Jaina doctrinal terms. By
contrast, philosophical rationalisations of the process of transmission of ascetic
energy via disembodied material objects are very rarely encountered, if at all.
These are considered to be heretical, since the existence of ascetic energy is
predicated on a connection of karmic matter with the soul. Apocryphal beliefs in the
71 In this respect only, the dominant strictly dualist Jaina position corresponds to the Therava¯da Buddhist
view. Cf. KV1,2 (XVI.8 for the controversy concerning the ‘‘heretical’’ views of the Sam: mitiya Buddhists
that ‘‘material qualities are results [of karmas]’’ (ru¯pam: [kamma-] vipa¯ko) and KV1,2 (VII.7 for the view
of the Andhaka Buddhists that ‘‘land is the result of action’’ pat:havı¯ kammavipa¯ko), that for instance ‘‘the
earth is a result of the action of a being who is a world-monarch’’ (pat:havı¯ cakkavattisattassa kamma-
vipa¯ko). Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 343, n. 125) also points to the last passage. On the difference between
kamma and kammavipa¯ko see also the Buddhist controversy described in KV VIII.9. In classical Jaina
doctrine, one of the terms specifying the results (phala) of automatically maturing experienced karman is
also viva¯ga (Sk. vipa¯ka), not to be confused with karmic particles (karma-pudgala) attracted by the
resulting action. The dualist position of classical Jainism, mediated by the concept of the karmic particle,
contrasts with the later Theravada position documented in the KV, ‘‘that the result of (vipa¯ka) of kamma
is a matter of subjective experience, that material effects per se do not arise directly because of human
action’’ (McDermott 1975, p. 433).
72 Brown (1998, p. 33) asked a similar question with regard to Buddha images: ‘‘If the Buddha produced
miracles through his power of iddhi, for example, is this also what allows an image to produce a
miracle?’’ His answer, like the argument proposed in this article for the case of bone relics, points to the
materiality of the sacred object. Granoff (1998a, p. 58), by contrast, pointed out that for the Jaina monk
‘‘in many cases an image, particularly a miracle-working image, is not an image but the Jina himself’’,
although ‘‘the modern scholar knows of course that it is the image of the Jina the monk/author of these
hymns is seeing’’.
73 According to the canonical Pan: n: avan: a¯ (P) 1.84, excreta and body secretions are said to populated by
uncountable sam: mucchima-man: ussa, tiny short-lived human beings invisible to the human eye, and
should therefore not be touched at all. Buddhist texts report the existence of similar views amongst at
least some Buddhist monks. Jaina mendicants are not allowed to study at a site where body parts
such as excrement, bones, blood, etc. are close (T: han:a 475b according to Schubring 1935/2000, §
150, p. 267, cf. Balbir 1990a). At the Spalding symposium, held in Oxford in honour of Professor
Karel Werner’s 85th birthday, Lance Cousins kindly pointed me to the late text Kathavatthu, or
Points of Controversy, of the Abhidhammapit:aka for Buddhist debates on the excrement of the
Buddha. Some Buddhist monks, according to the commentary (KVA) to KV1,2 XVIII.4 some of the
Andhakas and Uttarapathakas, held the view that ‘‘the excreta [uccara-passavo] of the Exalted
Buddha excelled all other odorous things’’. The refutation of this view points to the ‘‘fact’’ that
secretions of the Buddha were not collected by anyone to make cosmetics, etc.
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transferability of karman from one living being to another can occasionally be
encountered74, but are a minority view in Jaina discourse. Everyone knows that
karman accrues only to the living body of the agent, that is, the embodied soul, and
travels with the soul of the deceased to the place of its next incarnation. This leaves
only the physical attributes of the detached body parts of the ascetics as the
potentially transmittable source of the power of relics.
How then, if at all, can the often reported quasi ‘alchemical’75 processes of
crystallisation of ascetic energy in bone relics and other body parts be cogitated in
Jaina doctrinal terms? It seems, this is only possible if a concept of dead matter is
posited that remains charged with the results of karmically generated energy, for
some time, even after its dissociation from the embodied soul.
Formation of the Body
Jaina interpretations of the qualities of disembodied material particles presuppose
the classical Jaina concept of embodied matter and theoretical analysis of the
process of embodiment.76 The basic components of body formation are the pro-
cesses of attraction, bondage, and ejection of inanimate material particles by the
embodied soul (Viy1 18.3.5 [743b]), that is, the interaction between soul and matter
through the inflow and outflow of material particles.77 Two types of material par-
ticles are strictly distinguished in the texts: matter that constitutes the five bodies
(sarı¯ra) of the living being, that is, the embodied soul78, in accordance with its
karmic code79, and matter that is drawn from exterior (ba¯hira-poggala) for short
moments only without being incorporated. From the point of view of their status in
the karmic cycle, the texts further differentiate three modes of material particles:
74 See Cort (2003, p. 133ff.), Laughlin (2003, pp. 41, 47f.). Cf. Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 321) on Nya¯ya
conceptions of sharers of karman (karmabha¯gin) or the obstruction of the ripening of karman through
interference of karman of other living beings who are bound to have a shared experience (sama¯nopab-
hoga).
75 See Balbir (1990b, 1992), White (1996), and Sikdar (1980). For recent discussions of the lists of the
powers of the body of a yogin, though not body relics, which influenced the Jaina conceptions as well, see
the articles in Jacobsen (2012).
76 For details of the classical Jaina theory of the formation of the body, see Wiley (2000, Ch, p. 3).
77 See Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134) on the process of amalgamating (sa¯han: an: a), retaining (a¯ha¯ra
or a¯garisa) (cf. P 6.683ff., in Ma¯lvan: iya¯ 1971, p. 303), and secreting (bheya) atoms in Viy1 12.4.b–c
(567a–569a).
78 Viy. 8.1 refers to living beings only, which have a minimum of three bodies: gross, fiery, and karman
and a maximum of four at at any specific moment of time.
For the various permutations of body types and classes of beings, see the summary table by Wiley
(2000, p. 151). She points to the specifically Digambara distinction between separable (pr: thaka-vaikriya-
s´arı¯ra) and non-separable (pr: thaka-v.-s´.) transformation bodies (ib., pp. 147–150).
79 First matter constituting the karmic body is attracted by the karmic body itself, and then suitable
matter for constituting the other bodies which are pruced by different forms of na¯ma-karman.
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(1) ‘‘attractable particles’’ (gahan: a-poggala/davva)
80, (2) ‘‘attracted particles’’ (a¯ha¯ra-
p.), that is, particles by means of which the organic body of a living being is gradually
built up, and (3) ‘‘ejected particles’’ (nijjara¯-p.), which were discarded by acts of
self-purification or final liberation of the soul. Attractable and unattractable forms of
insentient matter are further sub-divided in accordance with the theoretical quantity
of their elementary atoms (parama¯n: u-p.) forming aggregates (skandha) of classes
(vaggan: a¯) of equal numerical value. The qualities of such aggregates are also dis-
tinguished by their basic physical attributes such as shape, colour, smell, etc.81
The locus classicus for the Jaina doctrine of the five bodies is P2 12.5.
82 The
manifest body of a living being is a composite of a minimum of two83 and a
maximum of four different types of bodies (sarı¯ra) since the vaikriya and a¯ha¯raka
bodies cannot co-exist. These are graded in terms of the increasing fineness and
density of their elementary material atoms (poggala) and molecules (kham: dha):
(1) gross body (ura¯liya-s./ora¯liya-s., Sk. auda¯rika-s´.),
(2) transformation body (veuvviya-s., Sk. vaikriya-s´.),
(3) translocation body (a¯ha¯raga-s., Sk. a¯ha¯raka-s´.),
(4) fiery body (teyaga-s., Sk. taijasa-s´.), and
(5) karman body (kammaga-s., Sk. ka¯rman: a-s´.).
80 Cf. the interpretations of TS1 8.2 (sakas: a¯yatva¯j jı¯vah: karman: o yogya¯n pudgala¯n a¯datte) by the
translator N. Tatia: ‘‘Because of its passions, the soul attracts and assimilates the material particles of
karmic bondage’’; which should better be translated: ‘‘… material particles capable of turning into karmic
bondage’’. Cf. TS1 8.24–25. Schubring (1935/2000, § 84, p. 173) emphasized that ‘‘matter attracted by
soul is not yet Karman, but it comes to be so’’). It is not exactly stated in TS1 8.2 that ‘‘Karmic matter is
said to be found ‘floating free’ in every part of occupied space’’ (Jaini 1979, p. 112). What is meant is that
fine matter capable of being transformed into karmic matter (karman: o yogya¯n-pudgala¯n) is everywhere
(personal communication Jaini, March 2008). See TS1-2 8.3 & 8.25, SAS 8.2, and Sikdar (1987, pp. 42,
80f.). Cf. Wiley (2000, pp. 408–410 on types of ‘‘graspable’’ matter. The texts distinguish between
attractable/non-attractable matter in terms of degrees of subtlety. Matter capable of being transformed
into a karmic body is so refined that it is invisible to the eye.
81 Sikdar (1987, p. 223–253). Frauwallner (1953/1997 II: 188) finds it ‘‘remarkable’’ that in the Jaina
theory of matter the qualities of the elements ‘‘occur to all the atoms equally’’, while the distinct qualities
of aggregates are caused by parin: a¯ma.—See also Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134), who points to the
vocabulary of the self-referential processes of attracting (sa¯han: an: a)—elsewhere called a¯garisa—and
secreting (bheya) material atoms in Viy1 12.4.b–c (567a–569a), where seven kinds of atomic regroupment
(poggala-pariyat:t:a) are distinguished in the context of the theoretical analysis of the mechanisms
responsible for building up and transforming the body by changing (parin: a¯ma) and extracting (nijjara¯)
karmic particles.
82 pam: ca sarı¯raya¯ pan: n: atta¯, tam: jaha¯ – ora¯lie veuvvie a¯ha¯rae teyae kammae (P2 12.5). See in Sanskrit
TS1-2 2.37–49.
83 Karman and fiery body, the ‘‘bearer of potential energies’’ (Schubring 1935/2000, § 62, p. 139): ‘‘All
bodies except the earthly one are closely linked with the soul’’ (ib.).
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The maximal five bodies of a living being84 are generated by the ka¯rman: a-s´arı¯ra
which is itself composed of invisible subtle particles that attract gross material
particles from the exterior and form them into atomic compounds of different
quality. According to classical Jaina karman theory, the presence or absence of the
capacity (labdhi) for the complete development of the personal body, the parya¯pta-
na¯ma-karman (Pk. pajjatta-na¯ma-kamma)85, which is a subtle form of karmic
matter attached to the unliberated soul from the very beginning, determines the
ability to attract from outside and further transform inanimate matter into animate
matter and to build up and maintain the maximal five types of bodies that are
attached to and obstructing the soul.86 It is the quality and quantity of this and other
na¯ma-karman which constitutes individual living beings of differential structure and
ability.87 The soul with the help of its parya¯pta-na¯ma-karman has the power to
attract suitable types of matter from outside the body which were already trans-
formed naturally. The material particles are then further modified within the body
by karmic processes.88 First, elementary forms of body matter are created which are
differentiated into a liquid part (rasa-bha¯ga) and a solid part (khala-bha¯ga). From
the two basic varieties seven primary forms of organic matter (dha¯tu) are produced,
of which flesh (ma¯m: sa) and bones (asthi or sthira) are the most significant solid
varieties. The physical strength of the body is dependent on the quality of the joints
connecting the bones, which are determined by the solid joint making karman
(sam: hanana-na¯ma-karman), which is considered as a type of physical power (s´akti)
producing karman.89 Even the physical attractiveness or repulsiveness, produced by
s´ubha- and as´ubha-na¯ma-karman, is a product of body forming karman.
Karman (here: action, that is, karman that comes to fruition) attracts matter in a
selective way: good karman (pun: ya-karman) attracts more subtle matter than bad
karman (pa¯pa-karman). By means of ascetic practices, including non-action
(ayoga), the influx of matter from the outside can be stopped (sam: vara), gross forms
of matter can be transformed (parin: a¯ma) into subtle forms of matter, and matter can
be discharged entirely from the body (nirjara¯). The processes of selective attraction
and of karmic transformation and dissociation of matter from the body of the ascetic
thus lead to the autocatalytic production of compounds of matter of very subtle and
pure quality, and finally to the liberation of the soul from embodiment. When they
are removed from the body, dissociated material particles return to their original
84 Viy1 13.7.1c (622b) distinguishes further two further bodies for beings who have not yet been fully
embodied in them: transitional transformation body (veuvviya-mı¯saya-ka¯ya) and transitional transposition
body (a¯ha¯raya-mı¯saya-ka¯ya). See Deleu (1970, p. 200), and Schubring (1935/2000, § 62, pp. 137–139)
who suggested that instead of ‘‘a¯ha¯raka ‘attracting’ its name should be a¯dha¯raka in that the body
represents a ‘vessel’’’. On the Jain theory of five bodies see Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 142). Notably, the
heavenly or vaima¯nika gods do not possess a gross body according to classical Jainism. On contrasting
Sa¯m: khya views compare for instance Oberlies (2006).
85 Its opposite is called apajjatta-na¯ma-kamma (Sk. aparya¯pta-na¯ma-karman).
86 For details on na¯ma-karman, see TS1-2 8.12, SAS 8.11, Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 11–18) and Wiley
(2000, pp. 117–231).
87 The body of a T^ırtha _nkara is made of the purest gross-body (parama-audarika) atoms.
88 For details, see Wiley (2000).
89 See Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 14f.), Wiley (2000, pp. 164, 170, 173f., 186, 220).
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inanimate state and can then be attracted by another embodied soul. The same
applies to aggregates (skandha) of material atoms that had been attracted, trans-
formed by their association with the soul, and finally dissociated (Viy1 14.4).
90 The
question is whether matter that was transformed and refined through karmic pro-
cesses retains its unique qualities and can be selectively reappropriated again by
another living being.
Embodied Pure and Auspicious Matter
Matter (pudgala) that is auspicious (s´ubha) and pure (s´uddha) is occasionally
referred to in late canonical and post-canonical texts to explain special ascetic
powers91 believed to be crystallised in the aggregates of particularly refined matter
that constitute the living ascetic body. Most prominent is the following passage in
the S´veta¯mbara version of Uma¯sva¯ti’s fourth century Sanskrit Tattva¯rthasu¯tra (TS1)
2.49, the principal text of classical Jaina doctrine accepted by both Digambaras and
S´veta¯mbaras, which explains the features of the conveyance body (a¯ha¯raka-s´arı¯ra),
known to be effective only for very short time92, that allows the ascetic to travel to
distant places for a short period of time while remaining connected with his physical
body (auda¯rika-s´arı¯ra). The conveyance body is made of a subtle form of matter
that is very auspicious and pure (s´ubha-vis´uddha) and invisible to the eye:93
The conveyance body is made of auspicious, pure, non-obstructive and non-
obstructed matter. It can be created only by a learned ascetic conversant with
the fourteen books of the early literature (TS1 2.49, translated by N. Tatia).
The Digambara version of the TS that was preserved in the fifth century com-
mentary of A¯ca¯rya Pu¯jyapa¯da, the Sarva¯rthasiddhi (SaSi), gives a different ending
to the same verse:94
The conveyance body is made of auspicious, pure, non-obstructive and non-
obstructed matter. Only an ascetic who is self-restrained but prone to laxity
uses this body (TS2 2.49, in SaSi3, translated by Jain).
In his commentary, Pu¯jyapa¯da focuses not on the creation but on the use of these
extraordinary bodies and stresses that it is slightly incorrect to strive for the
90 See infra.
91 For two types of matter used in the magical constitution of temporary bodies, see Schubring (1935/
2000, § 181, p. 318).
92 The ‘‘heretical’’ view of the Buddhist Mahim: sa¯sakas and Sam: mitiyas reported in the commentary
KVA to KV1,2 VIII.9 and XVI.7, that because ‘‘action of body and speech [are] either good or bad’’ the
‘‘material qualities (engaged therein) are also either good or bad’’] (ru¯pam: kusalam: pi akusalam: pı¯ti) [is
slightly different. What is meant is not a material karmic result (unthinkable for a Buddhist), but ‘‘the
physical motions engaged therein’’ (gesticulation, etc.) (KVA XVI.7).]
93 s´ubham: vis´uddham avya¯gha¯ti ca¯ha¯rakam: caturdas´a-pu¯rvadhara-eva (TS1-2 2.49).
94 s´ubham: vis´uddham avya¯gha¯ti ca¯ha¯rakam: pramatta-sam: yatasya-eva (TS 2.49, in SaSi3).
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accomplishment of a pure and hence powerful body such as this and that one should
make use of it if one is not self-restrained. However, the existence of ‘‘auspicious’’
and ‘‘pure’’ matter which creates ‘‘merit’’ (pun: ya-karma) is not disputed by
Pu¯jyapa¯da, as his commentary shows:95
The expression ‘auspicious matter’ in the sutra means that the clusters of
matter that constitute the conveyance body are pleasant in colour, odour, touch
and taste and that they produce merit. ‘Pure matter’ implies that the clusters
are transparent, shiny and conducive to harmless conduct. ‘Unobstructive and
unobstructed matter’ [avya¯gha¯ti] signifies that these clusters have free unim-
peded movement to the destination (SaSi3 2.49, summary by Tatia 1994,
p. 60).96
Since the terms s´ubha and vis´uddha can equally refer to ‘‘wholesome’’ and to
‘‘shining’’ forms of matter, the passage is somewhat ambiguous. Important for the
discussion of sacred matter is that in this context it has been understood to be a
merit-producing subtle form of matter. However, it is not explained how this subtle
form of matter produces merit.97 This form of matter exists only in connection with
the body of a living being.
Disembodied Pure and Auspicious Matter
Concepts of disembodied ‘pure-’ and ‘auspicious matter’, contrasted with ‘impure-’
or ‘inauspicious matter’, appear, in different contexts, already in the Prakrit
S´veta¯mbara A¯gamas, especially in the Viya¯hapannatti, most prominently in Viy. 5.9
and 14.9; the first being an early passage and the second a late passage representing
the most advanced theory of matter in the canon. These passages reflect different
stages of the new Jaina conception of matter which co-evolved together with the
transition from voluntaristic to systemic conceptions of karman in the middle and
late canonical periods. The model of karman as a system works with a concept of
action without an agent. It represents action as an objective auto-poietic process,
analogous to the agricultural seed-plant cycle, with karmic matter functioning as a
95 s´ubhaka¯ran: atva¯cchubhavyapades´ah: | s´ubhakarman: a a¯ha¯rakaka¯yayogasya
ka¯ran: atva¯cchubhamityucyate annasya pra¯n: avyapades´avat |
vis´uddhaka¯ryatva¯dvis´uddhavyapades´ah: | vis´uddhasya pun: yakarman: ah:
as´abalasya niravadyasya ka¯ryatva¯dvis´uddhamityucyate tantu¯na¯m:
ka¯rya¯savyapades´avat | … | (SaSi1 357).
96 Jain (1960/1992, p. 81), in his even less literal translation, renders the meaning as follows: ‘‘Some-
times the cause is identified with the effect. … Since it (the projectable body) brings about spotless and
pure result, it is called pure’’. The text explains, however, that a monk who uses these powers comes
down to the sixth of the fourteen qualitative stages (gun: astha¯na) of the path of salvation. On TS1-2 2.9,
see also Jacobi (1906, p. 308).
97 See also Wiley (2000, p. 144) on TS 2.49; and Wiley (2012, p. 185f.)
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seed-like particle.98 In Jaina philosophy of nature, matter, like the soul, is also
conceived as an ‘active’ or ‘moving’ (kriya¯) substance, unlike the other three of
altogether five substances (pañca¯stika¯ya). It undergoes somewhat similar systemic
processes of self-transformation (parin: a¯ma), of aggregation and disaggregation, as
does the karman of the embodied soul that automatically come to fruition. Classical
Jaina cosmology describes the parallel mechanisms of self-transformation of the
embodied soul and of inanimate matter and the results of their interaction.99
A few examples illustrate the range of application of the Prakrit terms suddha
and subha as attributes of disembodied matter: Viy1 14.2 (634a–636a), a text which
Ohira (1994, p. 64) locates in the fourth-fifth canonical stage (4th–5th century C.E.),
analyses spirit possession (umma¯ya) as an effect of the penetration of one living
body by ‘‘inauspicious particles’’ (asubha-poggala) sent off by another; in this case
a demon or god. This passage can be interpreted in two ways: Either it suggests that
the transmitted particles have moral characteristics, though there is no explict ref-
erence to a ‘transfer of demerit’ (pa¯pa¯), or, more likely, that the transmitted matter
itself has qualities which induces negative or ‘‘unpleasant’’ states. From the point of
view of karman doctrine, of course, possession, though experienced as real, is a
form of delusion, which can be cured by the application of discriminative knowl-
edge resulting in the ejection of the troublesome particles.100
A similar example is the brightness of the day, believed to be caused by the rays
of light sent out by the sun (which is conceived as a living god in classical Jaina
cosmology). In Viy1 5.9.2 (246b) and 14.9.4 (656a), two passages which Ohira
(1994, p. 64) located both in the ‘‘third canonical stage’’ (1st century B.C.E.–3rd
century C.E.), light is explained in terms of the concept of ‘pure’ or ‘shining’ matter
(the same principle is applied to darkness of the night which is interpreted to be the
effect of dark matter, tamas-ka¯ya). Here, the transmitted energy is not inducing
moral states in a living being, but is simply described as a natural phenomenon.101
According to Ohira (1994, p. 97), the ancient view ‘‘that light, darkness and sound
are independent entities’’, is invoked here, ‘‘which seems to have been prevalent in
the olden days when these were not yet considered as properties of substance’’.
98 Bhatt (1983, p. 111) located the first appearance of the theory of matter in the second layer and the
advanced theory in the last of three ‘‘textual layers’’ of the Viy. The fully developed ‘‘system theory’’ of
karman developed from c. the first to fifth centuries C.E. It culminated in the S´veta¯mbara tradition on the
focus on the distinction between jı¯va and ajı¯va and ‘‘the usage of ajı¯va in the sense of the astika¯yas minus
jı¯va and addha¯samaya’’ (Ohira 1994, p. 113). Cf. Werner (1996, p. 76) on Vedic concepts of ‘‘individual
organisms’’ as ‘‘self-regulatory systems’’, as ‘‘structural-functional units’’.
99 See infra on the theory of transformation.
100 Cf. Kapferer (1997) for similar methods employed in Sinhalese Buddhist anti-sorcery rites.
101 The words subha- and asubha-poggala mentioned in Viy1 5.9.2 (246b), 14.8, etc., are ambiguous, and
can alternatively be translated as in/auspicious or not/shining, but in this context were rendered by
Schubring (1935/2000, § 69, p. 151) and Deleu (1970, p. 204) as ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘impure’’. See Sikdar (1987,
p. 235 and Tatia 1994, p. 60) who prefer ‘‘inauspicious/auspicious’’.
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Temporary Bodies Created by Ascetics
The clearest and maybe only unequivocal exposition of the material qualities and
powers of ejected particles, their purity or impurity, and of their effects offered by
the Jaina scriptures is the analysis of the concepts of teya-lessa¯ (Sk. tejo-les´ya¯) and
kamma-les(s)a¯ (Sk. karma-les´ya¯) in the Viy.102 Both terms refer to forms of radi-
ating energy generated by the fiery body of advanced Jaina ascetics. According to
P 17.1188–1198, the kamma-lessa¯, or karmically produced radiance or personal
aura of the ascetic,103 is intrinsically connected with the quality and quantity of his
(her) id: d: his.
104 In Viy1 14.9.1 (655a) it is compared with material objects such as
the radiance of the sun and moon gods. The commentator Abhayadeva (ViyVr:
14.9.1) noted that the term sakarma-les´ya¯ could be interpreted by imperfect monks
(chadmastha) in the sense that les´ya¯ itself is karman.105 But this is not the case,
despite the ambiguous compound.106 Both Schubring (1935/2000, § 89, p. 185),
Deleu (1970, p. 212)107 and Ohira (1994, p. 126) emphasize that the ‘‘colouration of
the soul’’, (bha¯va-) les´ya¯, ‘‘is not karma’’, but is only carried by the ka¯rman: a-s´arı¯ra
during transmigration. Ohira (ib., p. 127f.) argues that in the theory of the process of
transmigration it performs the function of ‘‘pinpointing more exactly’’ a precise
place for the rebirth of a soul within a cosmographic region, matching the final les´ya¯
of its last incarnation before death. However, in time, this ‘‘original function’’ of the
term was forgotten and ‘‘les´ya¯ as the personality-index of beings came to the fore’’
102 See the proposed chronology of Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 202).
103 Schubring (1935, p. 267) suggested that this conception stems from the ‘‘popular belief in bright good
and dark bad hearts’’. Ma¯lvan: iya¯ (1971, p. 356) translated les´ya¯ as ‘‘mental temperament’’ and charac-
terised it as ‘‘nothing but a sort of transformation or modification of matter, which takes place depending
on the soul’’ (ib., p. 353). Building on this, Ohira (1994, p. 129) uses the description ‘‘psychical and
emotional tinges’’. Flu¨gel (2008, p. 7) suggested comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of ‘‘mood’’.
Malde (2010, p. 16), who discusses the salient literature, pleads for an ‘‘allegorical’’ understanding of
many passages on les´ya¯.
104 Ma¯lvan: iya¯ (1971, p. 353f.). See also Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 195f.).
105 Deleu’s formulation could lead to the same conclusion. See also Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 195–202).
106 See also ViyBh 14.9.123–125 on the difference between the two types of meaning of karma-les´ya¯:
‘‘pahla¯ artha karma ke yogya les´ya¯ tatha¯ du¯sra¯ artha karma kı¯ les´ya¯ kiya¯ hai’’.
107 The ‘‘concrete particles endowed with a karmic lessa¯ (saru¯vim: sakamma-lessa¯ poggala¯)’’ (Viy1 14.9
[655a], tr. Deleu 1970, p. 212) that are radiating out from a living being in the form of brightness or heat
are not the karma-les´ya¯ itself:
ham: ta¯ goyama¯! an: aga¯re bha¯viyan: a¯ appan: o kammalessam: na ja¯n: ai, na pa¯sai, tam:
pun: a jı¯vam: saru¯vim: sakammalessam: ja¯n: ai-pa¯sai’’ (Viy4 14.9.123)
According to Abhayadeva’s commentary (ViyVr: 14.1) to Viy1 14.1 (630a), summarised by Deleu
(1970, p. 203), kamma-lessa¯ refers to ‘‘‘Karmic lessa¯’, i.e. lessa¯ as a condition (bha¯va-les´ya¯), not material
lessa¯ (dravya-les´ya¯) because the latter is well defined (avasthita)’’. Ma¯lvan: iya¯ (1971, p. 354) suggested
that this distinction is rather late, since it cannot be found in the Pan: n: van: a¯. See also Ohira (1994, p. 128).
The same type of explanation is given by Abhayadeva (ViyVr: 14.9.136) on teya-lessa¯ in Viy114.9.5
(656b) (Deleu 1970, p. 212). Schubring 1935 / 2000 § 99: 199, however, noted that the commentaries are
often uncertain and sometimes clearly wrong.
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(ib., p. 129), now expressing ‘‘the total content making up an individual personal-
ity’’, that is, the ‘‘psychical and emotional tinges’’ (ib.) of the soul.108
The ontological status of the tejo-les´ya¯ is disputed in Jaina literature. According
to the auto-commentary on TS1 2.43, summarised by Tatia (1994, p. 57), the fiery
power is ‘‘only an attribute’’ of the fiery body, produced by the temporary expansion
of the space points of this body, and not a secondary body or entirely separate entity
which can be emitted (nisr:s: t:a)
109 or hurled intentionally from the body of the
ascetic, although this is precisely the impression conveyed by the depiction of
Gosa¯la’s attack on Maha¯vı¯ra in Viy1 15.C.7 (678a–b) (using the potentially deadly
‘hot’ form of his teya-lessa¯ only to be repelled by Maha¯vı¯ra’s ‘cool’ or protective
teya-lessa¯).110 Viy1 7.10.b (326b) similarly states that a monk who sends out a teya-
lessa¯ composed of non-sentient (acitta) particles will produce light and heat where
the teya-lessa¯ falls down.111 Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 200) finds this ‘‘remarkable’’ and
suspects that here a sentient being, a man, ‘‘manifests himself by virtue of his own
inborn les´ya¯’’ in an inanimate entity.
According to the dominant Jaina interpretations, transformation, translocation
and fiery bodies that are temporarily created by ascetics are never entirely separate
from the soul, but karmically produced by a process of momentary expansion of the
space points or paesas (Sk. prades´a)112 occupied by the soul beyond the limits of
the gross physical body.113 This process is called samuggha¯ya (Sk. samudgha¯ta),114
of which seven forms are distinguished in P 36. However, in his commentary, the
108 Ohira (1994, p. 127) argued:
The concept of les´ya¯, which expresses a general index of the total content making up an
individual personality, was readily available in the then non-Jaina schools.… It this appears
that the Jaina theoreticians seized this current concept, and assigned to it a faculty to
determine a being’s next birth place.… This les´ya¯ must have been conceived as something
material in connection with colour, like shining light tinged with colour.
109 Pk. nisat:t:ha.
110 Schubring (1954, p. 258) remarked: ‘‘[T]eya-lessa¯ ist streng genommen unzutreffend mit teya gle-
ichbedeutend gebraucht. Da es kein kalt-heisses tejas gibt (schon das kalte ist widersinnig), ist statt
sı¯o^sin: a… sa¯o^sin: a zu lesen’’. He agrees with Abhayadeva’s commentary, on which see also Wiley (2000,
p. 146).
111 See also Viy1 18.10 (757a).
112 On the Jaina theory of the ‘space points’ or ‘units of mass’, see TS1-2 5.7–5.11, 5.14, and Schubring
(1935/2000, § 55ff. 126 ff., etc). According to the Jaina theory, material and immaterial objects are
constituted temporarily by variable combinations of different elementary substances: the units (prades´a)
of space (a¯ka¯s´a) occupied by particles of matter (pudgala), the medium of motion (dharma), the medium
of rest (adharma), and of the soul (the concept of a unit of time or ka¯la is disputed within the tradition).
Inevitably, liberated souls, or siddhas, are also imagined as quasi-material entities, endowed with a set of
space-points (jı¯va-ghana), which are by definition immaterial, defining a particular occupied space
(avaga¯hana¯) of a definite size in the realm of the liberated souls, or siddha-loka, which is predicated on
the size of the body of the last rebirth. See Uv1 169–177, etc.; and W. Johnson’s (1995, pp. 130, 143,
262f., 304) reflections on the putative ‘original’ concept of the materiality of the soul in early Jainism.
113 Wiley (2000, pp. 142–152) pointed out that ‘‘[i]n such an expansion called samudgha¯ta, some of the
space-points of the soul (a¯tma-prades´a) remain in the principal body while others occupy the secondary
body, which goes to another location in the universe while the principal body remains behind.… leaving
no physical residue because the matter forming these bodies is very subtle and they lack the impurities
such as blood, bones, and flesh found in the auda¯rika s´arı¯ra of humans and animals’’ (142f.). For the
seven forms of samudgha¯ta, see Viy1 2.2 (129a) and P 36.
114 From the verb samohan: ai (S. samava-hana).
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Prajn˜a¯pana¯t:ı¯ka¯ (Pan: n: T: ), A¯ca¯rya Malayagiri, the twelfth century commentator,
equated samudgha¯ta with the process of ejection of karmic particles (nirjara¯) by
means of deliberate premature fruition (udı¯ran: a¯) of karman. While the space points
of the temporary bodies retract to the space points of the physical body, the particles
of dead karmic matter shed during samudgha¯ta, remain outside the body.115 In Viy1
2.2 (129a) and P 36.561b–608a and 590a, amongst the seven types of samudgha¯ta,
taijasa-samudgha¯ta, that is, hurling the taijasa-s´arı¯ra-na¯ma-karman out of the
body, is listed. But it is not included amongst the conscious acts of the soul
(prayoga) in P 16, as Ma¯lvan: iya¯ (1971, p. 346) highlighted in contrast to Mala-
yagiri. Hence, according to P, using a taijasa-s´arı¯ra as a weapon seems to be ruled
out.
Three examples of samudgha¯ta are of interest here: (a) taijasa-samudgha¯ta,
(b) vaikriya-samudgha¯ta, (c) a¯ha¯raka-samudgha¯ta.
(a) The most significant case, elaborated only in Viy1,2 14.9.1 (655a), are the
coloured karmic particles (sakamma-lessa-poggala), which emanante from the ad-
vanced Jaina ascetic which are compared and contrasted with the bright rays of the
sun or the moon.116 In contrast to the im/pure and in/auspicious particles or the rays
of the sun, the bright quality of the sakarma-les´ya¯ is characterised as a form of
matter which ‘‘shines forth’’ and for a while retains its distinct karman-generated
qualities even outside the emitting body.
The differences between karma-les´ya¯ and tejo-les´ya¯ are not entirely clear.
Two different reconstructions of the conceptual evolution have been offered by
Tsuchihashi and Ohira.
Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 201f.) proposes four developmental stages of the term
les´ya¯ in the canon, designating: (1) radiance in general, especially of the deified
heavenly bodies (les´ya¯), (2) lustre of an ‘‘organic’’ material substance (tejo-les´ya¯),
(3) coloration of the human body (A¯jı¯vika), (4) colouration of karmic atoms
(Jaina) (karma-les´ya¯). He points to the ‘‘remarkable’’ feature that the tejo-les´ya¯ of
an animate being penetrates an inanimate entity which is made to shine by ‘‘a
substance-like lustre’’, and derives the term teya-lessa¯ in Viy1 7.10.2b (326b) and
Viy1 15 and the ‘‘later’’ ‘‘strictly jinistic’’ (ib., pp. 197, 200) term kamma-lessa¯ in
Viy1 14.9.1 (655a) with Schubring (1935/2000, § 97, pp. 195, ‘‘we have reason to
believe that an adjective les´ya¯ was changed into a substantive’’) from the word les´a,
particle, which he also interprets as a sanskritised form of Prakrit lesa (Tsuchihashi
1983, p. 201f.). A. Mette (2010, p. 309) followed this interpretation and added a
tentative analysis of the different historical layers of the oldest Jaina text on les´ya¯ in
Utt1 34.
115 According to Ma¯lvan: iya¯’s (1971, p. 420) summary of Malayagiri’s commentary to this text (Pan: n: T: ),
‘‘samudgha¯ta is nothing but expulsion (nirjara¯) of very many particles of the karmas of one particular
type, causing their early rise through the special process of udı¯ran: a¯; this necessarily involves the previous
refrainment from the experience of the fruits of the karmas of all other types’’.
116 Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 199) pointed to M. Hara’s argument on the relatedness of the terms tapas, heat-
energy, and tejas, glow-energy. Schubring (1954, p. 257) suggested, however, that the word teya does not
designate here a ‘‘[concrete fire, but a collected, condensed transmitted energy or magical force] kon-
kretes Feuer, sondern eine gesammelte, geballte ausgesendete Energie oder Kraft’’. See note 119.
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Ohira (1978–1980, 1994, p. 126), by contrast, argues that the concept of karma-
les´ya¯ stands for the earlier concept bha¯va-les´ya¯ (antonym: dravya-les´ya¯), or psychic
colour, and is itself older than the concept of the ‘‘non-sentient’’ tejo-les´ya¯, which,
according to her, is conceived as ‘‘the capacity of a personality index’’ of an
ascetic.117 In contrast to karma-les´ya¯, tejo-les´ya¯ is conceived as a tangible ‘fiery’
ray of energy wilfully produced by an ascetic. It is produced by the118 fiery body
(taijasa-s´arı¯ra)119 which itself is generated by extensive austerities (tapas). This ray
of power can be either hot (usin: a) or cool (sı¯ya) (Viy3 15.65 ¼ Viy1 15.B.4 [666a]).
Because it is associated with ‘‘the miraculous powers of ascetics’’, Ohira (194,
p. 97f.) assumes, it must be later than the theory that ‘‘light, darkness and sound are
independent entities’’ rather than ‘‘properties of substance’’.120 She, therefore,
places the two passages Viy1 14.9.1 (655a) and Viy1 7.10.b (326b) respectively
between the first century B.C.E. and the third century C.E. and in the late fourth and
the fifth century.121
(b-c) External matter can be temporarily used by an ascetic to conjure up illusory
objects for instrumental purposes. Magical objects such as this are produced through
the momentary attraction (a¯ha¯ra) and transformation (vikriya) of ‘improper’ or
‘impure’ matter from outside of the body. Tejo-les´ya¯s, by contrast, are produced by
the extraction of matter from inside. According to Viy1 3.4 ff. (186a ff.), for creating
a magical effect, not a material body or a fiery body but a transformation body
(vaikriya-s´arı¯ra) has to be produced by a monk or a god. The powers associated
with these detached objects seem phantastic and are generally described as
117 On Viy. 14.9: ‘‘Les´ya¯ was thus understood in terms of karma-les´ya¯ in the beginning’’ (Ohira 1994,
p. 129). In Viy. 12.5 karma-les´ya¯ is immediately opposed to dravya-les´ya¯, the antonym of bha¯va-les´ya¯,
which illustrates the substitution of bha¯va-les´ya¯ by karma-les´ya¯ (ib.).
118 In Viy3 15.76 ¼ Viy1 15.B.4 (665b), as pointed out by Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, p. 317), the
word sam: khitta (Sk. sam: ks: ipta) describes the compression or accumulation of ascetic energy. See
Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 199–201) on the historical development of the term resulting in the meaning of
‘‘les´ya¯ as something like cement bringing about ‘union of a being with (infusing) karmic substance’’’
(p. 201); a process which can be connected with notions of moral fluids in early Jainism, which Schubring
(1935/2000, § 10, 15) linked to ‘‘primitive sorcery’’.
119 On the concept of tejas, in textual Jainism, see Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, pp. 316–319), See also
YS´ 1.9, and the commentary of Qvarnstro¨m. On the development of the term tejas (from the root tij,
sharpen) from the Vedas to the Pura¯n: as, see Magnone (1993, 2009a, 2009b). For textual Buddhism, see
Tambiah (1984, p. 203f.), citing Griswold. On tejas as ‘‘raw power’’ whose ‘‘manifold potential is open’’
in Sinhalese Buddhist sorcery rituals, see Kapferer (1997, p. 261).
120 Ohira (1994, p. 98) assumes in the context of her discussion of les´ya¯ that ‘‘talk about the miraculous
powers of ascetics’’ was not part of the older forms of Jainism. However, later in her text, she notes that
there is already evidence in the S´veta¯mbara scriptures of the existence of two early Jaina treatises on
‘‘magical power’’, the Ca¯ran: a¯bha¯van: a¯ and the Pan: hava¯yaran: a (Pras´navya¯karan: a), which are now believed
to be extinct; though Acharya (2007) seems to have the discovered a manuscript of the latter. Although
Vavaha¯ra 10, the text mentioning the Ca¯ran: a¯bha¯van: a¯, is placed in the period between the third and first
centuries B.C.E., Ohira (1994, p. 162) only concedes that the topic of magical power ‘‘might have arisen
in a slightly earlier age, e.g. the fourth canonical stage’’, that is, in the fourth century C.E. See also Ohira
(1994, pp. 56, 65).
121 ‘‘XIV.9.533 informs that sakarma-les´ya¯-pudgala discharged from the abodes of the sun and moon
gods shine forth. VII.10.307 explains that non-sentient tejo les´ya¯ emitted by an angry ascetic shines and
burns where it falls. The former belongs to the earlier stratum of the les´ya¯ theory in the third stage. The
latter idea became popular when the Jainas began to talk about the miraculous power of ascetics. We
place this text in the fifth canonical stage (Ohira 1994, p. 97f.)’’.
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‘miraculous’ (camatka¯rika) or ‘magical’ (ma¯yika) in Jaina texts. These effects are
just a magical illusion, as Schubring (1935/2000 § 181, p. 318) pointed out:
Viy. 154a; 190a in referring to both the monk and the god insists on saying
that it means simply an effect on the senses and nothing real whatever.… For
performing such an effect material particles not proper to the performer have
to be attracted, and only by applying them, ba¯hirae poggale pariya¯itta¯, he will
succeed in producing it (Viy. 189a ff.; 283a, 643a; 705b; Jı¯v. 374b; T: ha¯n: .
104b) in which case the texts differentiate such poggala that adhere to the
performer from such adhering to the speaker or else to some third place
(tattha-gaya, iha-g., annattha-g.).
Though lucid in theory, the dividing line between illusory (‘magical’) and real
effects is often hard to discern in the texts describing the extraordinary abilities of
Jaina ascetics.122 The vaikriya and taijasa powers can be used to produce both
illusory and real objects outside the body and either for selfish and potentially
harmful or salvific aims.123 Only the power to create and use the equally ephemeral
a¯ha¯raka or transformation body is said to be solely beneficial.124
Substance and Mode
The power of body relics cannot be explained in the same way as the power of
karma-les´ya¯s or of objects generated by magical tricks. What kind of material
substance then constitutes body relics? Everything that exists is constituted by the
five eternal substances (davva) known as the ‘‘mass of all that is’’125 (atthika¯ya)
(Viy. 2.10). The five substances are: medium of motion (dhamma), medium of rest
(adhamma), space (a¯ga¯sa), souls (jı¯va), and matter (poggala). They are all divisable
and constituted by elementary units (paesa) which are conceived of as the invisible
122 Glasenapp (1925, p. 404, 1999, p. 446) argued that among the Jainas a dividing line between
(Tirtha _nkara) cult and magic is more difficult to draw than elsewhere because they also venerate Hindu
gods and goddesses.
123 The intention of the ascetic thus becomes an important factor for distinguishing Jaina ascetics from
non-Jaina ascetics or ‘‘magicians’’. In the texts, the overall ‘‘religious’’ orientation is identified as the
decisive factor, determining the superior power of Jaina ascetics. Viy1 3.6 (191b), for instance, informs us
that capable (bha¯viya-appa, Sk. bha¯vita-a¯tman) monks can see distant objects via supernatural sight, that
is, create a representation of a distant object in their mind; but only the supernatural perception of a
righteous (samma-dit:t:hi) monk who is both capable and pure corresponds to reality, not the perception of
a non-believing (miccha¯-dit:t:hi) ascetic, whose powers are weaker due to his fundamental delusion.
Similarly, Viy1 18.10.1 (757a) states that capable monks are able ‘‘of moving in the air without support’’
(Schubring 1935/2000, § 181, p. 318). By contrast, the commentary of TP II.4.1042–1057 describes the
capabilities of moving through the air in realistic terms, as based on the support of living beings
inhabiting the air (‘without harming them’).
124 The use of this body is restricted to ascetics of high purity and one particular purpose only:
Unlike other bodies, the conveyance body is very short-lived. When the ascetic has any
doubt in his mind about the meaning of a very difficult and obscure issue of the doctrine, he
uses the conveyance body, expands his soul into this subtle body, reaches the distant Jina
instantly and withdraws to the gross body within an intra-hour (less than forty-eight min-
utes). The conveyance body is abandoned as soon as the mission is completed (Tatia 1994,
p. 60).
125 Schubring (1935/200, § 57, p. 126).
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but theoretically quantifiable space points that are occupied by a particular sub-
stance.126 All substances exist in space and are formless (aru¯va) and hence invisible,
with the exception of matter which has a tangible form (ru¯va) (Viy. 1.10).
Disputed is in classical Jaina philosophy the question whether time (ka¯la) can
also be categorised as a substance or, if not, what its ontological status could be.127
The question boils down to the conundrum whether time, like the other five sub-
stances, can be reduced to space (as in conventional linear representations of time)
or whether it exists only in form of singular discontinuous moments.128 Most
Digambara philosophers argue that time is a substance, because it has auxiliary
transformative functions.129 In their view, the causative function of time alone
explains both the continuation of a particular substance over a certain period and its
final disappearance. Hence, it should be declared to be a substance (TS1,2 5.22 &
5.49, SaSi1 569 & 357). S´veta¯mbara authors deny this. They argue that because time
has no extension in space (like the other formless substances) it cannot be a sub-
stance. Time exists only in the form of unconnected moments. A compromise in
terms of the two-truth theory is offered by SaSi1 569 which distinguishes between
conventional (sequential) time (vyavaha¯ra-ka¯la) and absolute (momentary) (para-
martha-ka¯la) time, as two different perspectives on two principal aspects of time.
Perspectivism is at the heart of classical Jaina ontology. For classical Jaina
philosophy, encapsulated in the famous tripadı¯ formula of TS1(2) 5.29 (5.30),
130
which A¯ca¯rya Uma¯sva¯ti created to encompass competing eternalist Hindu and
temporalist Buddhist ontologies, existence (sat) is constituted by the three causative
modes of origination (utpa¯da), persistence (dhrauvya), and cessation (vyaya). From
the perspective of substance (dravya) everything that exists is eternal, i.e., is con-
stituted by imperishable elements, but from the perspective of mode (parya¯ya)
everything that exists is forever changing. A difference of opion concerns the
mediating concept of gun: a which designates the persisting qualities that distinguish
different substances or entities. In contrast to the standard S´veta¯mbara position,
expressed in Utt 28.5 and TS1 5.37, that a substance is constituted by both qualities
and modes, the S´veta¯mbara A¯ca¯rya Siddhasenadiva¯kara (STP3 III.8ff.) argued that
the terms gun: a and parya¯ya are synonymous, as did A¯ca¯rya Malayagiri.
131 Ohira
(1994, p. 92) pointed to the significance of the concept of gun: a for the theory of
material transformation (parin: a¯ma) cum motion through processes of atomic
126 Ohira (1994, p. 99f.), who accomplished her work under D.D Ma¯lvan: iya¯, offers a theory of the
evolution of the theoretical concept of prades´a (from vpra-dı¯s´, to manifest), the ‘‘cause of perceptibility’’,
starting with the word a-prades´a, non-indication, non-determination, to indicate the invisible nature of the
atom.
127 Pu¯jyapa¯da (SaSi1 569) and other Digambara commentators on TS 5.22, a verse on the concept of
transformation (paran: a¯ma), characterize time in terms of the qualities of non-sentience and immateriality.
128 Cf. Heidegger (1918–1919/1995, p. 307, etc.), for deliberations on similar questions.
129 Not as a material but as an instrumental cause: nimitta-ka¯ran: a.
130 sad dravyalaks:an:am |
utpa¯da-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktam: sat |
Existence is the character of a substance.
Origination, cessation and persistence constitute existence. (TS2 5.29–30)
131 See Malvan: iya (1971, p. 246).
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attraction and repulsion, ‘‘by the degrees of gun: as existing in matter itself’’,
132
which may be one reason for its incorporation in the classical dravya-gun: a-parya¯ya
sequence.
Modes of Material Transformation
The Jaina concept of continuity through change is further theorised under the title of
parin: a¯ma or transformation of substances of entities in P 13, Viy1 1.1.3 (23a), 1.3.4
(55a),133 etc., and TS1 5.41 in particular; both with regard to material atoms
(pudgala) and aggregates (skandha) and to living entities.134 Viy3 14.4.52 states that
there are two types of transformations: of animate beings (jı¯va-parin: a¯ma)
135 and of
inanimate beings (ajı¯va-parin: a¯ma). The theory of transformation is both the foun-
dation of classical Jaina karman theory and of the Jaina theory of matter. The locus
classicus for the concept of parin: a¯ma in Jaina philosophy is Viy 8.1.
136 Ohira
(1994, p. 56) places this chapter and all thematically similar texts of the Viy. in the
fifth and last canonical stage of her scheme (4th–5th century C.E.), having located
the first appearance of the theory of pudgala-parin: a¯ma in the second or third
centuries C.E. (ib., p. 93). All modern commentators agree that the theory of
transformation is late-canonical.
Viy1,3 8.1.1 (328a)
137 distinguishes three types of material particles (poggala)
and Viy1,3 8.1.2 (332b) similarly three types of individual entities (davva)
138 with
reference to distinct modes of transformation—natural, karmic and mixed—that
produced them139:
132 Cf. the Vais´es: ika solution by postulating karman as an independent category of motion. See Ohira
(1994, p. 92).
133 ‘‘This atthittam: atthitte parin: amai [¼ the attribute being existent remains if the entity undergoes
transformation] is as elementary a tenet as calama¯n: e calie etc.’’ (Deleu 1970, p. 77 on Viy1 1.1.3).
134 See Ohira (1994, p. 99) on the contrast between Jaina parin: a¯mava¯da, which emerged in the ‘‘third
canonical stage’’ and the Vais´es: ika position that existence becomes non-existence after the desctruction
of an entity in Vais´es: ikasu¯tra 9.2.
The practical implications of the once dominant Jaina perspective that atoms change while being
changed are illustrated by Jaina critical analysis of the powers of transformation of gods, for instance in
Viy1 16.5 (704a–708b).
135 The term jı¯va is ambiguous. In its embodied form it is seen ‘‘as somehow indistinguishable from the
body’’ (Ohira 1994, p. 110).
136 For the sources on parin: a¯ma, see Vijayara¯jendrasu¯ri 1913–1925/1986 V: 595–614, and on prayoga-
mis´ra-vis´rasa¯ parin: a¯ma parin: atah: pudalah: pp. 602–610.
137 In identical words: T: ha¯n: a1 3.3.401.
138 A particular object is also called dravya albeit being a ‘‘substance’’ of ‘‘a second order’’ (Schubring
1935/2000, § 61, p. 136). On the multiple meanings of the term dravya in Indian philosophy, see Halbfass
(1992, p. 89f.).
139 tiviha¯ poggala¯ pan: n: atta¯, tam: jaha¯ – paoga-parin: aya¯, mı¯sa¯-parin: a¯ya¯ vı¯sasa¯-parin: a¯ya¯ (T: ha¯n: a1 3.3.401
¼ Viy3 8.1.1).
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1. Transformed by external (karmic) impulse (paoga-parin: aya, Sk. prayoga- parin: ata),
2. Transformed by mixed causes (karmic & natural) (mı¯sa-p., Sk. mis´ra-p.),
3. Transformed spontaneously (naturally) (vı¯sasa¯-p., Sk. visrasa¯-p.).140
The term prayoga-parin: a¯ma, transformation by external impulse, designates
changes that are brought about (consciously or unconsciously) by the action of the
embodied soul. According to classical Jaina doctrine, this form of karmic causality
produces the five bodies of living beings.141 Visrasa¯-parin: a¯ma, spontaneous
transformation, designates the processes of natural (svabha¯va) transformation of
inanimate atoms, such as aggregation, disaggregation, etc., independent of any
interference of embodied consciousness.142 According to Viy3 8.1.27, 8.10.467,
spontaneous transformation affects the colour, smell, taste, touch and shape of
matter.143 In P 13 the term parin: a¯ma refers to natural processes of atomic aggre-
140 I follow the terminology of Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133–136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 154,
206), who also uses ‘‘instrumental and automatic process[es]’’. Since action (karman) involves conscious
and unconscious processes, Lalwani’s (1980 III, p. 103) (Viy6 8.1.1) translation ‘‘conscious transfor-
mation’’ is merely a shortcut.
141 Viy5 8.1.50–71 explains how various permutations of karmic activity result in different material
transformations. The gross physical body, for instance, is transformed by conscious physical activity
(ka¯ya-payoga-parin: aya), resulting in bodies of different degrees of purity (Viy5 8.1.55 ff.) and power
(vı¯rya-s´akti) (Amar Muni, commenting on Viy5 8.1.71). ‘‘This threefold activity [paoga]’’, of mind,
speech and body, though considered to be material, ‘‘is considered to be of the soul (a¯tmavya¯pa¯ra)
because it does not take place in its absence’’ (Ma¯lvan: iya¯ 1971, p. 345). Different interpretations of the
term prayoga, principally treated in P 16 in the canon and under the title prayoga-karma in the
Digambara S: at:khan: d: a¯gama (ib.), have influenced the available translations. Paoga-parin: a¯ma was
translated by Amar Muni as ‘‘conscious transformation’’ (Viy5 8.1, p. 468), while Schubring (1935/2000,
§§ 60, 61, pp. 133, 136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 120, 206, 237), preferred the neutral formulation
‘‘accidental change’’ (parin: a¯ma) caused by an ‘‘impulse from without’’, that is, karman, an ‘‘instru-
mental process’’ of mind, speech and body (Viy1 1.3.3 [254a]).
Maha¯prajn˜a’s commentary (ViyBh 8.1.1) to Viy4 8.1.1 (III, p. 6) summarises divergent interpretations
of this passage:
Uma¯sva¯ti in his Bhagavatı¯vr: tti 8.1 focuses on the three different causes of the bondage of material
atoms constituting the structure of the molecules of a physical body: 1. prayoga: effort of the soul (jı¯va-
vya¯pa¯ren: a s´arı¯ra¯ditaya¯ parin: ata¯h: ), 2. mis´ra: a combination of both, 3. svabha¯va: nature.
Siddhasenagan: in in Tattva¯rthabha¯s:yavr: tti (TBV) 5.17 relates the three types of transformation to the
Jaina teaching of the three causes (ka¯ran: a): 1. material (parin: a¯ma) (‘‘¼upa¯da¯na’’), 2. final (nirvartaka),
3. instrumental (nimitta); different from the Vais´es: ika triad of causes: 1. inherent (samava¯ya), 2. non-
inherent (but closely related) (asamava¯ya), and 3. instrumental (nimitta). Cf. Potter (1997, p. 55–57).
Siddhasen: a Gan: in defines prayoga also as the action of the embodied soul (TBV 5.24: prayogo jı¯va-
vya¯pa¯ras tena ghat:ito bandhah: pra¯yogikah: ).
The Digambara philosopher Akala _nka, by contrast, in his Tattva¯rthara¯java¯rtika (TRV) 5.24, under-
stands it as designating the union (sam: yoga) of the human body, speech, and mind (prayogah: purus:a-
ka¯ya-va¯d-manah: sam: yoga-laks:an: ah: ).
142 Dual causality of nature and karman is well established in Digambara literature as well. See SaSi1
529–531.
143 pam: cavihe poggala-parin: a¯me pan: n: atte, tam: jaha¯—van: n: a-parin: a¯me, gam: dha-
parin: a¯me, pha¯sa-parin: a¯me, sam: t:ha¯n: a-parin: a¯me || (Viy3 8.10.467).
Frequent implicit references to the Pan: n: avan:a (P) I & XIII are made in the sections on matter in Viy. 8.1
& 8.10, Viy. 14.4. See Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 206f.).
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gation, disaggregation and movement.144 Mis´ra-parin: a¯ma, mixed transformation,
finally, refers to a combination of karmic and natural processes.145
According to Viy3 8.1.40–41, mis´ra-parin: a¯ma produces the five bodies of living
beings in a similar way as prayoga-parin: a¯ma. Since both karmic and mixed causes
are involved in the formation of the five bodies of living beings (Pk. ka¯iya) (Viy3
8.1.27, 8.1.40f.), the question emerges what exactly the difference between these
two forms of transformation is? An indirect answer is given in Viy3 8.1.43 which
states that any particle or aggregate can be transformed karmically, naturally or in
both ways combined. Most objects in the world are the product of natural trans-
formation, followed by products of mixed transformation and finally products of
karmic transformation (Viy3 8.1.84). If more than one particle or entity is involved,
as in processes of aggregation, then the products of three types of transformation
can exist in combination (Viy3 8.1.73). According to the developed Jaina theory of
karman, effectively all living entities are constituted through mixed processes of
transformation. Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. xix) called attention to the fact that the
summary Karmagranthas of the S´veta¯mbara A¯ca¯rya Devendrasu¯ri give however
only an evasive explanation of how natural processes further differentiate the kar-
mic particles which were attracted by the actions of the living being in such an
ingenious way that complex organisms emerge:
I am aware of only one passage wherein the author deliberately raises the
question concerning the cause. It is contained in Kg. II., 75a; herein the author
raises an objection as to how it is possible that the particle of matter seized in a
moment by the soul is capable of transforming itself into the number of
particles necessary for the formation of the various species of the karman,
whereupon he replies that it is performed through the mysterious power of the
soul, of which we may not make to ourselves any idea, and through the
peculiar quality of the matter itself. It may be observed, he argues, that matter
on which no spiritual force is working, is changing into clouds and rainbows;
why then could not matter with which a jı¯va is in connection be changed into
different kinds of karman? All further discussion is cut off by an energetic
‘alam vistaren: a.
A related question is whether processes of karmic and mixed transformation apply
only to matter forming the body of living beings or also to inanimate matter outside
the body? This question, which touches at the heart of the conundrum of the status
of ‘sacred matter’ in Jaina philosophy, is not clearly addressed in the Viy. itself, but
was taken up by the commentaries. The term mis´ra-parin: ata is explained in
somewhat greater detail in Viy5 8.1.46–47 and 8.1.72–73, but remains controversial
in the commentary literature.146 Different opinions are recorded in modern refer-
144 See Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133).
145 Schubring (1935/2000, § 61, p. 136) comments on this passage: Material masses of this kind
[inanimate aggregates], together with their shapes, come into being spontaneously, whereas all accu-
mulations furnishing the souls in the world with bodies and opportunities of activity … result from
impulse, i.e., through the working of the Karman. But as these accumulations have concrete qualities, it
follows that they represent a mixture of both cases (Viy. 332a).
146 For the following, see Maha¯prajn˜a’s summary of the commentaries: Viy4 8.1.1, pp. 5f.
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ence works. Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 179f.) defines mı¯sa-parin: aya poggala as
a ‘‘molecule which has matured into a mixed state, i.e. has left the soul but has not
yet assumed another form’’. Deleu (1970, p. 145), by contrast, states unambiguously
that it is only the ‘‘animate world’’ which results from conscious and mixed
transformation. Natural transformation affects only colour, smell, taste, touch and
shape. The assessment of the scope of the category of the mis´ra-parin: ata pudgala
varies even more widely in the classical commentaries. In the older commentaries
the paradigmatic examples for products of mixed transformation are material ob-
jects outside the body which have been transformed by the activity of living beings
who worked on them. In the later commentaries dead bodies or body parts of living
beings are cited as examples; that is, either products of mixed transformation within
the living organism or products of a two-step sequence of karmic transformation
within the body followed by natural transformation outside the living organism.
Thus, not only organic-cum-inorganic matter147, but also inorganic matter that had
once been transformed by the activity of living beings and was then ejected is
categorised as a product of mixed processes of transformation.
The Digambara A¯ca¯rya Akala _nka (8th century) in his Tattva¯rthava¯rtika (TV)
5.24 does not accept mixed transformation as an independent category. Instead, he
distinguishes two sub-types of karmic transformation (prayoga-parin: a¯ma): of non-
living entities (ajı¯va-vis:aya) (for instance wood covered with shellac) and of mixed
living-and-not-living entities (jı¯va¯jı¯va-vis:aya).
148 Akala _nka further differentiates
two types of the latter: karma-bandha and nokarma-bandha, that is, processes of
binding particles that form the karmic body (ka¯rman: a-s´arı¯ra), on the one hand, and
processes of binding particles of the gross-, transformation-, transposition- and fiery
bodies, on the other hand. The same example of wood covered with shellac for the
transformation of non-living matter was selected later by the ca. ninth century
S´veta¯mbara A¯ca¯rya Siddhasenagan: in in his Tattva¯rthasu¯tra¯dhigamabha¯s:yavr: tti
(TSB) 5.24. Siddhasenagan: in, however, does accept ‘mixed-transformation’ as a
separate category and explains mis´ra-parin: ata with reference to the examples of the
pillar (stambha) and of the water pot (kumbha) which are both created by a com-
bination of naturally produced clay and form-giving human activity.149 Siddhase-
nagan: in and Akala _nka both agree that ‘mixed-transformation’ applies only to
objects outside the living body if they are shaped not only by natural processes but
additionally by the actions of living beings.
The Mu¯rtipu¯jaka A¯ca¯rya Abhayadevasu¯ri (11th century.), by contrast, in his
Sanskrit commentary Bhagavatı¯vr: tti (ViyVr: ) 8.1, chose as examples for products of
mixed transformation (1) the corpses of human beings, etc., that naturally decom-
pose (mukta-kad: evara¯di-ru¯pa), and (2) naturally transformed classes of gross, etc.,
matter (auda¯rika¯di-vargan: a-ru¯pa) that are further transformed by the actions of
147 Sikdar (1987, pp. 235–237 and 213).
148 TRV 5.24: sa dvedha¯ ajı¯va-vis:ayo jı¯va¯jı¯va-vis:ayas´ceti | tatra¯’jı¯va-vis:ayo jatuka¯s: t:ha¯i laks:an: ah: |
149 TBV 5.24: prayoga-visrasa¯bhya¯m: jı¯va-prayoga-sahacarita¯cetana-dravya-parin: ati-laks:an: ah: stam-
bha-kumbha¯di-mis´rah: |
33
living beings.150 The Stha¯nakava¯sı¯ Pravartaka Amar Muni interpreted the text as
follows:
Jointly transformed matter – This is of two types – (1) naturally transformed
matter without disintegration of the consciously acquired form, such as a
corpse. (2) Naturally transformed species of karmic particles, such as those
needed to form the gross physical body etc., further transformed consciously,
such as the gross physical body of a being (ViyVr: , according to Amar Muni,
Viy5 8.1, Vol. 2, p. 468; Translation from Hindı¯ by Surendra Bothra).
The two complementary processes envisaged here are, first, the ejection of karmi-
cally transformed matter from the soul and the subsequent natural transformation,
and, second, the reverse process of attraction of naturally transformed matter and its
further karmic transformation by an embodied soul building up its bodies.151 In the
first case, the transformative actions of living beings are followed by processes of
natural transformation. In the second case, processes of natural transformation are
followed by actions of living beings.
For Abhayadevasu¯ri it is quite clear that atoms and molecules that form the
material body of an acting living being (jı¯va) are also subject to processes of natural
transformation. Our question, what exactly the difference is between karmic and
mixed transformation is answered by him as follows. The transformation through
action (prayoga) also involves processes of natural transformation (visrasa¯), and in
this sense can be considered as a form of mixed transformation. But natural
transformation is not essential (vivaks: ita) in this context. However, in processes of
mixed transformation both prayoga and visrasa¯ are essential. The same point was
made already by Siddhasenagan: in (TBV 5.24), who argued that the question about
the way in which the two processes are combined cannot be settled in abstract terms,
but only with reference to a particular context. In processes of transformation
through action, the innate effort (samava¯ya-ka¯ran: a) of the living being alone is
sufficient. No external instrumental cause (nimitta-ka¯ran: a) is necessary. In pro-
cesses of mixed transformation, an additional external cause is always necessary.
Processes of natural transformation, on the other hand, are indifferent (nirapeks:a) to
both the inherent cause and the instrumental effort of living beings.152
150 mis´raka-parin: ata¯h: prayoga-visrasa¯bhya¯h: parin: ata¯h: | prayoga-parin: a¯ma-matya-janto visra-
saya¯ svabha¯va¯ntaram a¯pa¯dita¯h: mukta-kad: evara¯di-ru¯pa¯h: | athav-auda¯rika¯di-vargan: a¯-ru¯pa¯
visrasaya¯ nis:pa¯dita¯h: santah: jı¯va-prayogen: -aikendriya¯di-s´arı¯ra-prabhr: ti-parin: a¯mam a¯pa¯-
dita¯s te mis´ra-parin: ata¯h: nanu prayoga-parin: a¯mo’py evam: -vidha eva tatah: ka es: a¯m:
vis´es:ah: ? satyam: ; kinnu prayoga-parin: ates:u visrasa¯ satyapi na vivaks: ita¯ | (ViyVr: 8.1).
151 Cf. Sikdar (1987, p. 327).
152 Siddhasenagan: in notes that the process of transformation through inherent causes (samava¯ya-ka¯ran: a)
can be related to concepts of Vais´es: ika philosophy (ViyBh 8.1.1). See supra for Abhayadeva’s reinter-
pretation of ‘‘samava¯ya-ka¯ran: a’’ in the sense of ‘‘combined causes’’ in his TVB.
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Dead Bodies and Relics
Viy. 8.1 does not discuss the ontological status of dead bodies.153 Yet, as we have
seen, at least one of the significant commentators, Abhayadeva, points to the dead
body as a paradigmatic example for an object produced by mixed karmic and
natural causes. Following on from this, I would argue that body parts such as relics
can similarly be conceptualised from the perspective of classical Jaina philosophy as
material objects which were created by mixed karmic and natural causes. The
distinction between insentient matter in general and the matter of dead bodies and
relics is that the physical structure of the latter is the product not of natural but of
mixed causes of transformation. In fact, it could be argued that from the perspective
of classical Jaina philosophy, the material qualities of bone relics differ from
qualities of inorganic matter outside the body in a similar way as organic chemical
compounds were in Europe once believed to differ from inorganic compounds, until
experimental counter evidence was furnished by Friedrich Wo¨hler in 1828.154 The
relics of Jaina mendicants are special, however, because the material aggregates
resulting from ascetic processes of transformation are ideally predicated entirely on
wilful instrumental action and hence differ in structure from aggregates that
underwent unchecked processes of mixed transformation. Effectively, two types of
relics produced by mixed natural and karmic causes are distinguished.155 In contrast
to the matter of common dead bodies, which is shunned, the relics of Jaina ascetics
are considered valuable because material results of exemplary renunciatory action
are in part crystallised in the living bodies as well as in the remaining dead mat-
ter.156 The bodies and body parts of advanced Jaina ascetics, it is believed, are not
constituted by ordinary organic compounds, but by extremely refined matter, like
the body secretions and other material particles that are ejected from the ascetic
body. Jaina mendicants compare the beneficial physical properties of ascetically
distilled ‘‘auspicious matter’’ such as body secretions and physical remains with the
properties of medical pills.157 In contrast to body secretions, the physical qualities
of ascetically produced body relics last for some time even after the severance of the
gross body from the soul at the point of death.
153 It refers however to cases of mixed bodies (mı¯sa-sarı¯ra), and of conscious or mixed transformation of
gross (etc.)-cum-mixed bodies (ora¯liya-mı¯sa¯-sarı¯ra-ka¯ya-payoga/mı¯sa¯-parin: ae) (Viy3 8.1.49) (etc.).
154 See Sikdar (1987, p. 237f.). In modern science, the notion of ‘organic compounds’ is still used as a
shorthand for certain shared qualities of plant and animal produce, such as the presence of carbon.
155 Cf. the third of Laidlaw’s (1995, p. 242f.) three styles of Jaina usage of the body, especially the
iconic style: (1) ‘Indexical’ — ‘normal’ use of the body for the simultaneous pursuit of renunciatory and
worldly ends; (2) ‘Dualistic’ — attempt to destroy the body in order to liberate the soul; (3) ‘Iconic’ —
representation of the perfect body as an expression of inner purity. Laidlaw’s categories do not form a
logical continuum, and indexical and iconic features are not clearly identified in the text. The dualistic
path is not ‘‘largely’’ a Jain lay project (ib., pp. 152, 238).
156 The results of action come to fruition mainly in the process of reincarnation determined by the karmic
body.
157 Personal communication of the Tera¯panth mendicants Saman: ı¯ Caitanyaprajn˜a¯, London 5.9.2008, and
Muni Mahendra Kuma¯r, La¯dn: u¯m: 22.12.2009. Cf. Friedrich (1943, p. 220) on the medical use of pills
made of the bones of Tibetan Lamas.
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The fact that the different types of dead matter that are distinguished (or dis-
tinguishable) in Jaina philosophy have apparently not (yet) been valorised in this
way in official Jaina culture, despite the evident options in Jaina ontology, can only
be explained by a historical combination of soteriological and social factors. The
question of the historical function of the relics of renowned ascetics in Jaina culture
can however not be addressed in this article.158 From a strictly karman theoretical
perspective, the material products of ascetic labour may be special and even
beneficial for the material wellbeing of living creatures, yet, they can in no way
affect the soteriological prospects of the devotee which are entirely determined by
his or her own renunciatory practice.
The Material Qualities of Bone Relics After Cremation
The main argument of this article is that, technically, not only dead bodies but also
bone relics of venerable saints, though apparently not mentioned in the commen-
taries to Viy. 8.1 and 18.3.2159, belong to the Jaina category of matter formed by
mixed karmic and natural causes. The two main transformative processes involved
in the production of bone relics are: (a) attraction of exterior matter and constitution
of the body through karmic activity and natural causes, (b) death, dissociation of the
soul, and either natural decomposition or cremation of the gross body.
An important question is how cremation affects the quality of the physical
remains. From the late Vedic period onwards, the process of decomposition of dead
bodies was deliberately accelerated through cremation by the majority of the pop-
ulation in South Asia who could afford it. After the incineration of the corpse and
the cooling of the ashes, the remaining more or less preserved charred bones (at:t:hi-
jha¯ma) were collected and disposed either on the spot or at ‘sacred rivers’. These
practices continue even today. What kind of material qualities can be attributed to
the charred bones and ashes that remain after cremation from a Jaina philosophical
perspective? In which way does the deliberate process of incineration, which itself
is of mixed karmic and natural causality, transform the physical structure of the
body?
Viy1 1.2.2 (213a) tells us that this very question was once put to Maha¯vı¯ra by his
chief disciple Gautama. Maha¯vı¯ra explained that the burning of all physical sub-
stances is a process of transformation of matter attracted by fire beings (tea-ka¯ya)
with the help of wind-beings (va¯u-ka¯ya), both of which are conceived as living
creatures in classical Jaina doctrine (Viy1 16.1 [213a]). In the process of cremation,
the dead bodies that originally belonged to mobile beings become the bodies of fire
beings:
[Q.] Bhante! To what category of living beings do the bodies of bone, burnt
bone, skin, burnt skin, pelt, burnt pelt, horn, burnt horn, hoof, burnt hoof, nail
and burnt nail belong?
158 Cf. Flu¨gel (2010b).
159 A comprehensive review of the Jaina commentary literature is beyond the scope of this study.
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[Ans.] Gautam! Bone, skin, pelt, horn, hoof, nail these are all bodies of mobile
beings (trasa jiva). Burnt bone, burnt skin, burnt pelt, burnt horn, burnt hoof,
burnt nail are the bodies of mobile beings in terms of their earlier or original
state. After that when they are processed with implements and so on up to
[ja¯va] fire and undergo transformation they may be called bodies of fire-
bodied beings (Viy5 5.2.15, translated from Hindı¯ by Surendra Bothara¯,
cf. Viy8 5.2.53).
160
The same answer is given in Viy5 5.2.16 in reply to the question as to the nature of
ashes (cha¯riya) and other materials fuelling fire, such as cowdung, etc. Similarly,
DVS 5.1.7 stresses that a monk should not step on warm ash and other forms of
matter recently touched by fire to avoid killing life in the form of fire beings.161
Cold ash, by contrast, is considered to be dead162, and is commonly used by to
prevent bleeding in the ritualised periodic plucking of hair and beard (kesa-loya)
that is obligatory for Jaina mendicants.163 For Jaina philosophers there was no doubt
that the remains left by the cremation fire were aggregates of dead matter; at least
for a short period after the flames have died down and before new souls start
repopulating the material remains. Within a period of one muhutta, that is, less than
forty-eight minutes164, it is said, dead matter, such as ash, may be repopulated by
living souls. In their process of decomposition, bone relics, too, should be able to
function as hosts for reincarnating souls and become one-sensed beings (like fire,
even stones can be living entities), though no text known to the present writer seems
to have dealt with this question. If this is not the case, then a further explanation of
the exceptional status of bone and tooth relics, which decompose only slowly,
would have been found.165
The reliable production of relics is predicated on the practice of cremation, and
the aim to produce relics may have been one of the reasons for the introduction of
the practice of cremation for prominent saints at least in the case of Buddhism as
160 The Jaina theory of transformation of ever changing modes of eternal atomic particles in the act of
incineration differs from those of the Vais´es: ika and Naiya¯yika philosophies, as Sikdar (1987, pp. 300–
309) and Maha¯prajn˜a (ViyBh 5.2.51–54) have pointed out. The Vais´es: ika philosophers assume that in the
process of baking for instance all individual atoms (pı¯lu-pa¯ka) are destroyed and recreated in a new form.
Naiya¯yika thinkers, by contrast, posit that the changes affect the whole body (pit:hara-pa¯ka). The indi-
vidual atoms remain the same in the process of baking, but are mixed with fire particles which accounts
for the transformed appearance.
161 For Vedic views on the fire hidden in the ashes, see Krick (1982, p. 122).
162 For Manu1 3.97, etc., ‘‘dead ash’’ has negative connotations, since it implies the extinction of the life-
giving fire. One should not step on it: ‘‘A person who wants to live a long life will avoid stepping on hair,
ashes, bones, skulls, cotton seeds, and chaff’’ (Manu1 4.78). Hair represents fertility and vitality cross-
culturally. This is also the case in the Vedas. See Krick (1982, p. 88f.).
163 Water mixed with cold ash is considered to be dead and therefore acceptable for mendicants because
of the chemical reaction, not because ash is associated with fire. Because water is killed by ash (fire),
some Jains believe it to be wrong to immerse the bones and ashes that remain after cremation into rivers.
164 Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 193) explains that a muhu¯rta equals two ghadı¯s or 3,773 breaths.
165 K. Wiley (personal communication 1.11.2010) remains sceptical: ‘‘This would relate to the operation
of nirma¯n: a na¯ma karma in association with ja¯ti na¯ma karma. In other words, a soul taking birth as an
earth-bodied being would form various sorts of bodies, but not one that has the qualities or shape of a
‘bone’’’. See also Friedrich’s (1943, p. 201f.) discussion of the unique physiology of bones.
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suggested by the famous account of the funeral of the Buddha in the Mahaparinivva¯
-n: asutta. However, cremation was not always practiced, certainly not amongst the
Nigganthas. Canonised scriptures such as the S´veta¯mbara Kappasutta and its
commentaries and the Digambara Bhagavatı¯ A¯ra¯dhana¯ describe the ways in which
corpses of dead ascetics should be discarded in the wilderness and left to the wolves
and vultures, which disperse the remaining fragents of bones in all directions. The
comparatively slower process of physical decomposition is also described as staged.
The matter produced by five-sensed living beings is re-transformed by karmic activity
of one-sensed beings and hence loses many of its previous qualities. As a result of this
process of transformation, after a while, a different type of dead matter remains.
The power of one-sensed living beings (egim: diya) is, of course, limited and
cannot explain the extraordinary energy attributed to relics.166 Nevertheless, even in
their decomposed or cremated form, as physical matter, certain fragments of the
body parts created by the actions of the ascetics retain some of their original
material properties and hence are said to have healing qualities, like a pill produced
by Ayurvedic medicine or the pharmaceutical industry.167
Enduring Power of Body-Parts Outside the Body and Transfer of Power
Another question is how these properties, if indeed they exist, can be transferred to
or appropriated by another living being? No satisfying answer, it seems, can be
found in the Jaina texts. Evidently, dissociated karmic particles automatically loose
their quality as karmic matter once severed from the embodied soul: ‘‘Karmic
particles thus purged are mere matter particles (pudgala) devoid of karmic efficacy’’
(Ohira 1994, p. 196). The question whether karmically transformed matter also
immediately loses its powers after being disconnected from the body is disputed
within the (S´veta¯mbara) Jaina tradition. The concept of the special power of dis-
embodied body parts of ascetics would otherwise play no role. Contrary to this
view, it is stated in Viy1 14.4 (638a–641a) ¼ Viy3 14.4.44–53 that because atoms
are eternal (sa¯saya) only from the point of view of substance but not eternal from
the point of view of mode (colour, etc.), they revert back to their original state once
a particular transformation (parin: a¯ma) has been accomplished. Once the atom is
reset to its original state a new transformation can start. The same applies to mol-
ecules (kham: dha), that is, aggregates of material atoms (in this context called
parama¯n: u-poggala), which (can) combine to form individual objects (davva). After
the completion of a particular transformation they, too, revert back to their original
state. The fact that aggregates will, at some stage, decompose into their elements is
166 See Wiley (2000, p. 125).
167 Uv1 159, however, mentions imperfect Jaina monks (saman: a) who hand out ashes which miracu-
lously cause wellbeing (bhu¯i-kammiya¯). Cf. Strong (2004, pp. 10–12) on the distinction between ‘‘bones
and beads’’ prevalent in contemporary Buddhism in South East- and East Asia (but not in the Pa¯li canon).
He argued that these beads could be interpreted as ‘‘the result of a process of metamorphosis brought on
not only by the fire of cremation but also by the perfections of the saint (in this case the Buddha) whose
body they re-present’’. On the process of transformation of bones into beads brought about by the
cremation fire see also Granoff (2008, p. 60).
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discussed separately in the texts.168 The notion of an original unmodified state of an
eternal elementary atom with specific qualities (colour, smell, etc.) is, of course, a
theoretical limiting case.
Perception and Reappropriation of Karmically Transformed Particles
It is an open and from the now dominant doctrinal Jaina point of view undoubtedly
heretical question whether disembodied ascetically refined particles (poggala) can
be perceived and re-appropriated by another living being.169 This interpretation
seems however to inform Viy1 18.3.2 (740b) ¼ Viy2 II.18.3.8–9, a passage sum-
marised by Deleu (1970, p. 237), which tells us that ‘‘when a monk who has
cultivated his spiritual faculties dies … the subtile ultimate particles of his karman
(je carima¯ nijjara¯-poggala¯ suhuma¯) spread over the whole world (savvam: logam: pi
n: am: oga¯hitta¯n: am: cit:t:hanti)’’ through the process of ejection (samuggha¯ya) of the
remaining karmic particles. Human beings who are conscious (san: n: i) and attentive
(uvautta) and Vema¯n: iya
170 gods that are attentive and fully developed (pajjatta)171
‘‘can discern and attract (ja¯n: anti pa¯santi a¯ha¯ranti) these particles’’, but not
‘‘imperfect’’ human beings (chaumattha-man: ussa).
172 The second part of this
statement specifies that highly developed Jaina mendicants can and apparently wish
to ‘‘attract’’ the final highly purified particles ejected by the soul of an advanced
dying Jaina monk. By contrast, particles which are attracted by a living being but
not bound and immediately ejected (nijjara¯-poggala) are said to be without form
(ru¯va) and hence intangible (Viy1 18.3.5 [743b]).
173
A detailed discussion of the question of the perceptibility of dead karmic parti-
cles which are ejected during the process of samuggha¯ya (which not every living
and omniscient being undergoes) is offered in Uv1 169–180. Schubring (1935/2000,
§ 89, p. 184) refers in this context also to P 590a and 496a f. (his manuscript), which
considers with regard to an imperfect individual ‘‘whether and to what degree the
ejecting individual has committed actions to other beings to whom they [the par-
ticles] cause an injury’’. He argued that ‘‘[t]he whole conception doubtlessly comes
from the impression which pain, anger, curse and blessings cause within the
onlooker’’ (ib., p. 185).174
168 See ViyBh 14.4.44–47. Ohira (1994, p. 56) points out that in the summary of the theory in Viy. 14.4 it
is stated that when the process of transformation (parin: a¯ma) of matter from one state to another as such
comes to an end, a pudgala or skandha ‘‘returns to the state of an atom of one colour, etc.’’ (ib.).
169 As the above cited English translation of Amar Muni’s comments on ViyVr: , 8.1 suggests.
170 Like humans, Vema¯n: iya gods are either untruthful and/or heretical or not, as explained in the text.
171 The term pajjatti (Sk. parya¯pti) refers to the six powers of the na¯ma-karman of the embodied soul
(a¯tma¯- s´akti) to attract and transform different material atoms constituting basic functions of the physical
body: a¯ha¯ra, s´arı¯ra, indriya, s´va¯socchva¯sa, bha¯s: a¯, manah: . See SAS 8.11.
172 Deleu (1970, p. 237) refers in this context to P 590b, 596a ff. (A¯gamodaya-Samiti Edition) for further
details on ejected particles.
173 Deleu (1970, p. 238) points to Viy1 7.10.1 (323b) in this context, where Maha¯vı¯ra explains to A¯jı¯vika
heretics that ‘‘bad deeds get their karmic retribution … only in the living incorporated soul, not in
matter’’. Cf. P 590b, 596a ff., Deleu (1970, p. 212), Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134).
174 Compare the debate on the concept of vaira in early Jinism (Jainism).
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The commentaries show that the question of the quality and fate of ejected
karmic particles preoccupied Jain scholastics for centuries. In Viy1,2 14.9.2 (655b) a
series of asymmetrical oppositions is used to describe qualities of physical matter
from the point of view of their utility for living beings, as being favourable/unfa-
vourable (atta/anatta), pleasant/unpleasant (piya/apiya and man: un: n: a/aman: un: n: a),
desirable/undesirable (it:t:ha/an: it:t:ha), etc.
Notable is the parallelism to the question of perceptibility of les´ya. It is
emphasised in Viy1 14.9.1 (655a) that even an advanced mendicant cannot perceive
his own kamma-lessa¯ nor can he perceive his soul other than in its embodied state.
Viy 6.9, by contrast, discusses whether a god with an impure les´ya¯ can see the les´ya¯
of other gods or goddesses. The answer is no: only a god with a pure les´ya¯. In JA¯A
103 the same point is echoed with reference to ascetics rather than gods.
The question how subtle lifeless matter can be absorbed and further transformed
deserves a separate study. P. Dundas (1998, p. 44) and K. Wiley (2012, p. 185) both
pointed to the lack of ‘‘any explanation of the karmic processes associated with the
powers of healing’’ in Jaina literature. Wiley (ib.) suspects that ‘‘a¯ca¯ryas were
selective regarding the teaching of this material and were hesitant to commit details
regarding these powers to writing.’’ Jaina mendicants, however, invariably point to
the commentaries on TS 5.20, which describe the positive or negative contribution
of matter (pudgala) acting as an instrumental cause (nimitta-ka¯ran: a) on the body
and mind of living beings, if not prevented to do so by the will-power (purus: a¯rtha)
of the individual concerned.
Final Karman, Final Body
Interestingly enough, classical Jaina cosmology seems to envisage not only a
soteriological path for souls but also a soteriological path for matter from a trans-
formable to a non-transformable pristine existence. We have mentioned already the
theory that after a transformation an atom automatically reverts to is original state
unless it is transformed again. The conceptual status of the idea of an orginal state of
an atom seems to be the functional equivalent of the idea of the pure soul in the
realm of matter. But the issue is not entirely clear. In P 10 and Viy1 8.3.3 (365b) the
question is treated in terms of the relative location of any object, insentient or
sentient, either at the border (carama or carima) of the material world (loga) to the
infinite space of the non-world (aloga) or within (acarama or acarima) the world.
A liberated being, or siddha, is an example of such a carama existence of an eternal
substance. Abhayadeva’s commentary on Viy1 7.7.3 (311a) describes the omni-
scient (kevali) as a final body (carima-sarı¯ra).175 The context determines the
meaning of the word ‘final’. Viy1 14.4 (638a–641a)
176 explains that from the point
of view of substance (dravya) an elementary material atom (parama¯n: u-poggala) is
eternal (acarima), but from the point of view of place (khetta), time (ka¯la), and
condition (bha¯va) it is not eternal, but either not-final (acarima), that is, in the
175 See Deleu (1970, p. 139).
176 Especially Viy1 14.4.3b (640a).
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process of being transformed, or final (carima), that is, not ever returning to the
form of existence it was part of.177
What is final or non-final is relative. According to Abhayadeva, commenting on
the general rule exposed in Viy1 14.4 (640a), in the special case of a kevalin there
are also final atoms which ‘‘will never again enter that form of existence after
having left it’’ (Deleu 1970, p. 207). By definition, since at the moment of death, the
kevalin leaves sam: sa¯ra as a whole, the eternal physical atoms he leaves behind are
final with regard to the modes of time, place and condition, and thus can never be
transformed again. At the point of final samuggha¯ya all remaining karmic particles
are dissipated throughout the world (Viy1 18.3.2 [740b]). The question is whether
they are final only for the kevali or for other beings as well.178 The texts and
commentaries are ambiguous.179 Viy1 14.4 (640a) and Viy118.3.2 (740b) discount
the possibility of further transformation only in the case of liberated beings whose
karman produced particles cannot be appropriated again and are hence called final
or carima sarı¯ra-poggala.180
If indeed this feature applies only to the kevalin, then by implication karmically
transformed molecules that are ejected or left over by an unliberated soul can be
attracted and integrated again by the same soul in another incarnation, and of course
by other souls.181 This lends indirect support to our hypothesis that Jaina scholas-
ticism, in some passages at least, considers the idea that certain karmically acquired
properties can be objectified in disembodied material structures and transmitted and
re-appropriated in this form, unless they always revert back to their original form
and can only be incorporated in this form. The formulation of the ‘‘reset rule’’ in
Viy1 14.4 (638a–641a) must have been motivated by questions such as this.
The question, which desirable physical qualities distinguish karmically trans-
formed ejected particles from plain matter and how they can be advantageous to the
one who is able to discern and attract such purified matter would require a separate
177 Viy1 18.3.3 (740b) distinguishes between the binding of objects (davva) and of the binding of
conditions (bha¯va). The first occurrs either spontaneous (vı¯sasa¯-bandha), with or without a beginning, or
is brought about by an external impulse (paoga-bandha), resulting in either loosely (sid: hila) or tighly
(dhan: iya) bound karman, The second relates to the binding of primary karman (mu¯la-pagad: i) and
secondary karman (uttara-pagad: i) as the two principal modes (cf. P 5.465b ff.).
178 See supra.
179 See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89), Deleu (1970, p. 207), referring to Abhayadeva.
180 See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89; 184, n. 1). See also Abhayadeva’s comment in ViyVr: 14.4.51,
summarised by Deleu 1970: 207, that atoms that were ejected (samudgha¯ta) by an omniscient being at the
point of death are an exception, since they will never return to their original condition as far as place, time
and condition is concerned. They are therefore ‘‘final’’ (carima) in these respects, but not final as far as
their substance (dravya) is concerned. See also ViyBh 14.4.51.
181 Viy1 6.104 [286a] says that only particles that are within range are attracted by embodied souls. In
this context, the distinction in Viy1 14.6.1b (644a) between complete- (avı¯i-) and defective material
substances (vı¯i-davva) is also relevant.
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study and cannot be answered here.182 To this category of ejected particles belongs
the so-called final karman (carima kamma) (Viy1 5.4.9 [221b]); mentioned also in
Viy1 18.3.2 (740b) as discussed above. Suffice it to say that the process of inten-
tional selection and attraction of particles refined by others, if indeed it ever played
a role in lived religion, cannot be compared with Buddhist style merit transfers,
whether conceived in terms of an: umodan: a, empathy, or as a type of exchange where
merit functions as a kind of spiritual currency that is transferred by way of offerings
to Buddhist monks accompanied by recitations (see Gombrich 1991, pp. 165–181).
In the context of Jaina philosophy, the transmission of energy through attraction of
particles or continguity is primarily a physical process.
The Excluded Third in Classical Jaina Ontology
The view that matter itself is the result of karman has been put forward by a variety
of philosophical schools in classical India, such as the Buddhist Andhakas (KV 8.9)
or the Bra¯hman: ical Advaita Veda¯ntins, who entirely spiritualised the principle of
karman.183 A debate, related in Viy1 7.101 (323b f.), between Maha¯vı¯ra’s first
disciple Goyama (Gautama) and the householder Ka¯loda¯yi (Ka¯loda¯yin), who
according to Deleu (1970, p. 38) represented a A¯jı¯vika perspective, also concerned
the question whether the karmic retribution of bad deeds (pa¯va-kamma) manifests
itself in matter or in the embodied soul. Goyama’s answer was that only the soul can
generate karmic matter.184
Classical Jainism is dualistic, at least on the level of the substances, the ele-
mentary building blocks of the universe. Hence, not everything is determined by
karman.185 This conclusion, reached by the doctrinal debates in the late first mil-
lennium C.E., strongly influenced by Vais´es: ika philosophy, is still widely shared in
Jaina scholastic circles. The fate of the living entity186 is influenced as much by the
182 That the karmic particles are very subtle and intangible to the eye (Viy1 18.3.5 [743b]), so that,
according to Abhayadeva, only a kevalin, or omniscient being, can discern them, does not affect the basic
idea.
183 See McDermott (1975, p. 429) and Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 327).
184 The remark in Viy1 15.C.8 (680a ff.) that Gosa¯la asked to be buried (not cremated or simply
discharged) is most certainly a polemical pun on his interpretation of karman theory. On Ka¯loda¯yi see
also Schubring (1935/2000, § 57).
185 This view contrast, for instance, with the stance of the Advaita Veda¯nta philosophy of S´a _nkara for
whom ‘‘[t]h whole world … is itself nothing but a karmic lay’’ (Halbfass 1991/1992, p. 327). Contro-
versies on karmic determinism are also evident in Buddhist scriptures, such as KV XXI.7 and XVII.1,
which records the position of the Andhakas that the results of karman are fixed. See McDermott (1975,
p. 431f.).
186 Cf. Werner’s (1996, p. 185) observations on the difference between European and Indic notions of
spiritual entities.
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given conditions of nature as by its own actions and their consequences.187 Even if
the parameters of rebirth and death are broadly determined by karman, the precise
circumstances are not fixed.188 The concept of karma-les´ya¯ may have been invented
precisely for bridging this gap. Halbfass (1991/1992: 317) in his pioneering article
on the subject of competing causalities in Indian philosophy saw Jainism, one of the
few Indian traditions contributing to the philosophy of nature, as a ‘‘special case’’
because it ‘‘includes even minerals in its horizon of the living’’. Yet, apart from the
fact that on the whole animistic theories are more widespread than naturalistic
theories, Jaina philosophy always maintained the independence of the realm of
material causality,189 cemented by the classical astika¯ya theory, however much the
trend towards the superimposition of ‘‘religious and soteriological schemes and
perspectives upon biological, zoological, cosmological observations’’ (ib., p. 320)
pulled it away from recognising the existence of inanimate matter for which rec-
ognisable empirical examples are hard to find. No doubt, all 5 þ 1 substances are
either sentient or non-sentient, material or non-material. Yet, for all practical pur-
poses the conceptual distinction between inanimate and animate matter is too ab-
stract if not altogether contradictory and the criteria too imprecise to identify
tangible objects composed of dead matter. In late canonical texts, the metaphysical
distinction between sentient (sacitta) and insentient (acitta) bodies (ka¯ya)190 con-
trasts with a universal animism that is not yet evident in the early Jaina texts, as
B. Bhatt (1989, p. 135ff.) has shown. The general attribution of sentience to the
material elements of earth, water, fire and wind makes it virtually impossible for
mendicants to find a lifeless path or spot, as required by monastic discipline, except
by inference based on observed ‘‘acts’’ of ‘‘killing’’, and hence usually only for
187 Glasenapp (1925, p. 404f.). notes (in the Chapter ‘‘Magic and Mysticism’’) that Jaina scholastics, like
other Indians, do not see a contradiction between karman and a certain influence of the planets, assuming
a deeper inner harmony which can be studied through astrology. An example is the following summary
statement by Tatia (1951, p. 220, n. 1):
The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against a number of other doctrines about
creation. Some regarded time (ka¯la) as the determinant factor of creation. Every event
occurs in time and hence is determined by time. Others believe in nature (svabha¯va) as the
determining factor of creation. Things are determined by their own inherent nature. There is
nothing, inside or outside, over and above nature, that determines the course of events. This
leads to the doctrine of determinism (niyati-va¯da). There were others who believed who
believed in the fortuitous and accidental nature of the occurrences of events. There were
other doctrines as well. (Vide SvUp, I.2. S´VS, II.52–64). The believers in karman or the
unseen potency (adr: s: t:a), the after-effect of a good or bad action, regarded these theories as
inspired by materialistic tendencies and therefore rejected them as untenable. The Jaina
philosophers accord proper place to these doctrines as testified by our experience, while
installing karman in the supreme position. Karman is the ultimate determinant of the course
of events. Even time, nature and niyati are determined by karman and there is no such thing
as fortuitism. These factors, in so far as they are given to experience, are only the
expressions of the working of the supreme law of karman. (Cf. STP, II, 53; S´VS, II.79–81).
188 Jaini (1979, pp. 115–117) records known problems of Jaina karman theories. For instance that, ‘‘[a¯]yu
[longevity karman] does not precisely determine … but it establishes a framework or set of limitations
within which these can operate (ib., p. 126).
189 In TS 5.23–24 states that interactions between forms of matter cause both changes in natural phe-
nomena, such as clouds, rainbows etc., and the formation and changes of physical bodies as well as their
death (TS 5.19–20). Cf. Jaini (1979, pp. 100–102).
190 See for instance Viy1 7.7.2 (309b).
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short periods after death.191 In practice, conduct is therefore determined by con-
vention, codified by monastic law, not by actual acts of discrimination between
sentient and insentient forms of elementary matter.192 This particular contradiction
has been highlighted by opponents such as the A¯jı¯vikas.193 The canonisation of the
doctrine of dual karmic and natural causalities in classical Jaina treatises such as the
Pan: n: avan: a¯ and the later sections of the Viya¯hapannatti, which according to S. Ohira
(1994, p. 239) ‘‘distinguishes the Jaina school from the other philosophical
schools’’, rather presented logical dilemmas functioning as distinctions directri-
ces194 which generated disagreements and schisms within the tradition and hence
were constitutive for Jaina discourse.
In the Jaina tradition, discussions of the relative influence of karmic and natural
causality invariably culuminated in the question of the causes of involuntary
premature death,195 if not explicitly of ‘‘sacred matter’’. In the developed forms of
Jaina philosophy these dilemmas were explained away through variants of the two-
truth theory. Prior to this sophisticated epistemological solution (or rather: cir-
cumvention of the problem),196 Jaina philosophers generally posited a third, mixed
or neutral structure, mediating between the opposites of the asymmetrical religious
code of jı¯va-ajı¯va in one way of another. Multiple ambiguities resulted from the
interpolation of mediating categories. An example is the double meaning of the
fundamental ontological category of jı¯va, which designates both the ‘‘soul’’ as such
and in its embodied, polluted or mixed state as a ‘‘living being’’.197
Despite concerted attempts to suppress explicit dvikriya¯- and trira¯s´ı¯-va¯das, etc.,
implicitly ‘‘the excluded third’’ lived on in Jaina ontology. It was merely delegated
191 Bruhn (2007, p. 51) stressed that for practical ethics therefore almost only visible living beings are
relevant.
192 For similar distinctions between ‘‘‘Living’, natural soil and of soil that is ‘dead’ … because it has
been worked by digging [etc.]’’ in Buddhist souces, see Schmithausen (1991, p. 50). The view of
universal animism is absent in the oldest surving text (A¯ya¯ra I), as Bhatt 1989: 135ff. pointed out
(Schmithausen 1991, p. 3, n. 19). On the problem of elementary or small living beings (and its ‘‘solution’’
through the kas: a¯ya theory), see also Bruhn (2007, pp. 15f., 19, 24–26 ff., 51ff., 60).
193 ‘‘When a monk who has cultivated his spiritual faculties . . . walks in the prescribed way . . . and a
chicken . . . or a young quail . . . or an antlike insect . . . is trodden down . . ., he has committed an action in
agreement with his religious duties (ı¯riya¯vahiya¯ kiriya¯), not a profane and sinful action)’’ (Viy1 18.8.1–2
[754a], cf. Viy1 7.7.1 [309b]). On the problem of elementary beings and its ‘‘solution’’ through the kas: a¯ya
theory, see also Bruhn (2007, p. 15f.).
194 See Luhmann (1987) and Flu¨gel (1995–1996, p. 164f.).
195 According to the Buddhist KV VII.7–8 and XVII.2, the Ra¯jagirikas and Siddhatthikas of the Andhaka
School held that an arhat cannot have an untimely death (and hence be liberated) before all accumulated
karman has come to fruition. For the Therava¯dins, by contrast, ‘‘old age and death… are partly due to the
physical order’’ and not ‘‘properly … kamma-vipa¯ka’’. The commentator (KVU VII.8) tries to solve the
dilemma by distinguishing clearly between physical and mental results (kamma-vipa¯ka) of action
(kamma) (McDermott 1975, p. 426, cf. p. 432).
196 Albert (1968/1991, p. 126).
197 ‘‘The early Jainas … maintained that a jı¯va is somewhat indistinguishable from its body, but no
further thought was given to the nature of jı¯va’’ (Ohira 1994, p. 113).
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to a secondary ontological level,198 and interpreted as the product of the interaction
of the two fundamental ontological substances. The question how jı¯va and ajı¯va,
spirit and matter, can interact in the first place has never been convincingly
answered by Jaina philosophy, as Jaini (1979, p. 114) pointed out. K. Bruhn (2007,
p. 52) remarked that the notion of a ‘‘mixed’’ (mis´ra) state is (also) frequently found
in later Jaina dogmatics.199 The conception of mixed transformation put forward
in Viy. 8.1, for instance, shares certain similarities with the tera¯siya heresy of
Rohagutta who posited the existence of a third principle, nojı¯va, mediating between
life and non-life. However, it is characterised as a ‘‘combination’’ of two sequen-
tially distinct processes, not as an independent third type of process. ‘‘Mixed’’ is
here a descriptive and not an ontological category. In his Nandit:ı¯ka¯, the thirteenth
century A¯ca¯rya Malayagiri details different aspects of the trira¯s´ı¯ theory of the
‘‘A¯jı¯vikas’’, including its application to the theory of standpoints (naya), that is, the
postulate that an entity may be ‘‘of the nature of substance, of mode, or of both’’.200
Without considering the question of the dates of the texts, Basham (1954, p. 275)
suspected that the A¯jı¯vikas (like the ‘‘Traira¯s´ika Jainas’’) ‘‘seem to have accepted
the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme
of saptabha _ngi’’.
Arguably, the most significant ‘‘included third’’ category in classical Jaina
ontology is the concept of prades´a, an elementary individual space unit that mirrors
the material atom and the individual soul. It is imagined to be a two-dimensional
insentient and non-material square shaped template, which together with other such
units forms quantifiable grids that can be occupied by atoms or by entities (dravya)
formed by aggregates of material and/or spiritual substances (dravya).201
According to classical Jaina doctrine, even the liberated souls possess an indi-
vidual ‘‘body’’ shaped by the differential numbers of space units they occupy.202 At
the end of Viya¯hapannatti (Bhagavaı¯) 8.10 (423b), Gauyama¯ (Gautama¯) asks
Maha¯vı¯ra the question whether a living being (jı¯va) is the possessor of matter
198 The principle of the excluded third is also ‘‘violated’’ by the fourth of the sapta-bha _ngı¯s of Jaina
logic. However, the strategy of hierarchisation secured the non-violation of the law of non-
contradiction for each level or perspective. A paraconsistent form of logic as proposed by Priest and
Routley (1989, p. 17) is not implied. See Flu¨gel (2010a, p. 168).
199 In his commentary on Viy. 8.1, Maha¯prajn˜a (ViyBh 8.1) pointed to the distinction between living
(sacitta), non-living (acitta) and mixed (mis´ra) objects in BKB 2693–2697 to distinguish six causes for
quarrel:
saccitte accitte, mı¯sa vaogaya pariha¯ra desakaha¯ |
sammamn: a¯uttam: te, ahigaran: amo samuppajje || BKB 2693||
The commentary gives as an example for each of the three: a disciple, his equipment (clothes, begging
bowl), and a disciple with his equipment. The commentary explains that the equipment of a monk, though
lifeless itself, should never be given away (to laity in particular) because they can become objects for
quarrel.
200 NSBh in Weber (1888 II.1, p. 685, n. 4), translated by Basham (1951, p. 274).
201 Technically, it belongs to the substance space. Cf. footnote 17.
202 On the quasi-material concept of the soul in canonical Jainism (can it be conceived otherwise), see
Jaini (1979, p. 113f.). (‘‘Just how a nonmaterial thing can in any way interact with a material one is not
well clarified.… Jainas themselves are in fact not absolutely rigid in maintaining the immateriality of the
soul’’) and Johnson (1995, pp. 128f., 262, 304).
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(poggalı¯) or itself matter (poggala). The answer is that it is both. Finally, Gauyama¯
asks the same question concerning the status of the liberated soul (siddha):203
Question: Bhante! Are the perfected beings pudgali or pudgala?
Answer: Not pudgali but pudgala.
Question: Bhante! Why do you say so … ?
Answer: Gautama! Relative to another living being, a perfected being is a
pudgala. Hence so (Translated by Lalwani 1980, p. 298).
Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132), Deleu (1970, p. 158) and Ohira (1994, p. 113)
explained that here two meanings of the word pudgala come into play: ‘‘matter’’ and
‘‘individual’’ entity (material or immaterial).204 With regard to the siddha, the word is
used ‘‘in the sense of an individual soul which is a well known Buddhist term’’.205
Ohira (1994, p. 99) suggested that the Jaina concept of the prades´a must have been
proposed as a solution of the theoretical problem how different substances ‘‘can
interpenetrate in the minutest space’’. In her view, without the concept of prades´a ‘‘the
doctrine of astika¯yas could not have been formulated’’ (ib., p. 106f.). The prades´a
theory in turn led to the differentiation of ‘‘the standpoint of ks:etra or space from the
standpoint of dravya or substance’’ (ib., p. 100) and to the elevation of a¯ka¯s´a to an
independent substance, as in other systems (ib., p. 106f.). ‘‘Heretics’’ questioned the
astika¯ya theory (ib., p. 103f.).206 But it is precisely this theory which must have
contributed to the subsequent avoidance of a karman reductionism in the manner of the
Andhakas and the Advaitins and hence to subsequent discussions of problems of
multiple causalities in the Jaina tradition, echoing similar debates in Bra¯hman: ical and
Buddhist circles at the time, analysed by Halbfass (1991/1992).
The most influential and essentially unsurpassed solution of the problem of
multiple causalities in Jaina philosophy was formulated by A¯ca¯rya Siddhasena-
diva¯kara, the famous Jaina logician who lived in the fifth and sixth century C.E. He
was claimed by both Digambaras and S´veta¯mbaras as one of theirs, but linked to
203 siddhe nam: bham: te ! kim: poggalı¯? poggale?
goyama¯ ! no poggalı¯, poggale ||502||
se ken: at:t:hen: am: bham: te ! evam: vuccai –siddhe no poggalı¯, poggale ?
goyama¯ ! jı¯vam: pad: ucca | se ten: at:t:hen: am: goyama¯ ! evam: vuccai – siddhe no
poggalı¯, poggale ||503|| (Viy3 8.10.502f.).
204 On this passage see Schubring (1935/2000, § 67, p. 147) (poggalı¯ ¼ bearer of senses), and Deleu
(1970, p. 158) (‘‘The soul (jı¯va) is poggalı¯ scil. Possesses atoms of matter, namely in the senses, as well as
poggala, i.e. individual. This is also true for every being in the sam: sa¯ra, but not for the Siddha who is only
poggala’’). See also Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132) (‘‘poggala, the word for atom, is applied in its
basic meaning as a ‘concrete body’ in Viy. 176a, whereas in 240a it means the part of an individual’’), and
Deleu (1970, p. 116) (‘‘atom’’, ‘‘object’’).
205 Sikdar (1964, p. 561) notes that ‘‘‘[p]oggala’ sometimes stands as synonym for soul’’; as in Viy1
20.2.2 (775b) ¼ Viy3 20.2.17, where poggala is listed as one of twenty synonyms (including a¯ya¯) for the
word jı¯va, but ‘‘in the sense of body’’ according to Deleu (1970, p. 253). On the Buddhist Puggalava¯dins
conception of personal entity (puggala), see also KV I.1.198 and McDermott (1975, p. 424f.).
206 See Ohira 1994: 104f. on the Ka¯loda¯yı¯ episodes in Viy. 7.10, 13.4, 18.7.
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the Ya¯panı¯ya tradition by Upadhye (1974/1983, p. 200) because of his ‘‘differ-
ences with the known doctrines of the Digambaras and S´veta¯mbaras’’. In his Pra-
krit Sam: matitarkaprakaran: a (STP) III.53, Siddhasenadiva¯kara distinguished five
theories of causation (ka¯ran: a) in Indian philosophy: time (ka¯la), nature (saha¯va),
destiny (niyaı¯), (unknown) actions of the past (puvva-kaya), and human effort
(puris:a).
207 He argued that individually, taken in isolation (egam: ta), they are all
one-sided and hence false, but if considered together (sama¯sa), from a perspective
of synthesis, they are all true.208 According to this interpretation, not the content of a
proposition, but the orienting point of view is decisive for its relative ‘‘truth-value’’.
This is one of the first explicit versions of the philosophy of aneka¯nta-va¯da, or non-
one-sidedness, which is nowadays seen as a trademark of Jaina philosophy.
According to Siddhasenadiva¯kara (STP III.46–49),209 there are as many heresies
(para-samaya) as there are standpoints (naya), because all one-sided standpoints
necessarily emphasise contradiction (pari-virodhana). The Jaina perspective, by
contrast, emphasises synthesis (samanvaya). By transcending differences and dis-
putes based on one-sided perspectives through its concept of aneka¯nta-va¯da Jainism
(jina-vacana) encompasses all heresies:
207 These are well-known and mostly pre- or non-Jaina theories, starting with S´vUp 1.1.2, have been
formally incorporated in Jaina philosophy in form of the so-called ‘‘363 account’’. See Schrader (1902,
pp. 2–4, 17–57), Barua (1921/1970, p. 198), Folkert (1993, p. 233f., 274f., 327–329) (Translation of
Haribhadra’s Nandı¯vr: tti).
208 ka¯lo saha¯va niyaı¯ puvvakayam: purisa ka¯ran: egam: ta¯ |
micchattam: te ceva¯ (va) sama¯sao hom: ti sammattam: || 53||
(STP3 III.53)
In his commentary, Abhayadeva gave the following Sanskrit gloss:
ka¯la-svabha¯va-niyati-pu¯rvakr: ta-purus:aka¯ran: aru¯pa¯ eka¯nta¯h: sarve ’pi ekaka¯
mithya¯tvam ta eva samudita¯h: paraspara¯’jahaddhattayah: samyaktva-ru¯pata¯m: .
pratipadyante iti ta¯tparya¯rthah: | (TBV III.53)
Following the Sanskrit commentary, the Gujara¯tı¯ editors and commentators Sa _nghavı¯ and Dos´ı¯ 1932/
1952: 171 inserted the word ‘‘adr:s: t:a’’ after ‘‘pu¯rvak.ta’’ in their Gujara¯tı¯ translation of Abhayadevasu¯r’s
Sanskrit rendition and give the following equivalent terms for the five causes in their Gujara¯tı¯ com-
mentary: ka¯la, svabha¯va, nivr: tti, karma, purus:a. A. S. Gopani 1939/2000: 127 offered the following
English rendition of the ga¯tha¯:
Ka¯la (Time), Svabha¯va (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Pu¯rvakr: ta Adr: s: t:a (Unknown actions of
the past) and Purus: a¯rtha (effort) – all these five taken singly are false because they touch
only one point. They all are true if they are made use of with reference to each other (STP3)
The role of personal effort (purus: a¯rtha) is decisive from the Jaina point of view. See footnote 41.
Sa _nghavı¯’s and Dos´ı¯’s 1929: 710, n. 5 note to their edition of the original text with the commentary TBV
III.53 point to several other texts that address the problem of different causalities, not all of them Jaina
texts, amongst them Haribhadra’s eighth century S´a¯strava¯rta¯samuccaya (S´VS) II.164–174 ¼ II.52–62,
II.191–193 ¼ II.79–81 and earlier verses.
209 Interpreted by Abhayadevasu¯ri and further by Sa _nghvı¯ and Dos´ı¯ (1939/2000, pp. 121–124).
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[Let there be] prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false
views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the
salvific happiness (STP III.69,210 Translated by Balcerowicz 2003, p. 42).211
Elaborating on this perspective, the previously mentioned S´veta¯mbara A¯ca¯rya
Abhayadevasu¯ri in his twelfth century commentary Tattvabodhavidha¯yinı¯ (TBV)
pp. 710–717 established ‘‘his own Ka¯ran: a-Samava¯ya-Va¯da’’.
212 The terms
samava¯ya, ‘‘combination’’, and samava¯ya-buddhi, ‘‘understanding of combina-
tion’’, are used by Abhayadevasu¯ri (TBV1, pp. 106–110, 156f., 700–4) in their
literal sense, not in the technical Vais´es: ika sense of ‘‘inseparable concomitance’’,
‘‘inherent-’’ or ‘‘material cause’’, or ‘‘inherent relationship’’ between substance and
quality or whole and part,213 to which they obviously allude. Sa _nghavı¯ and Dos´ı¯
(1932/1952, p. 312, n. 1//1939/2000, p. 126, n. 1) use the synonym samanvaya,
‘‘synthesis’’,214 and refer in a footnote (TBV1, p. 710, n. 5) to the Sanskrit
S´veta¯s´vatara Upanis:ad v. 2, a late text of the Yajurveda tradition
215 addressing the
question of the cause of Brahma (brahma-ka¯ran: a),
216 as the likely model for Sid-
dhasenadiva¯kara’s Prakrit verse (ga¯tha¯). Here, the term sam: yoga, ‘‘junction, union’’
(MW 1181) is used in a thematically similar context;217 but rather than ‘‘actions of
the past’’ (pu¯rva-kr: ta-ka¯ran: a) listed by Siddhasenadiva¯kara, ‘‘chance’’ (yadr:ccha¯),
is given prominence amongst the causal factors:218
Should we regard it [the cause of Brahman] as time, as inherent nature, as
necessity, as chance, as the elements, as the source of birth, or as the Person?
210 baddam: miccha¯-dam: san: a-samu¯ha-maiyassa amayasa¯rassa |
jin: a-vayan: assa bhagavao sam: vigga-suha¯hi-gammassa ||STP III.69||
An alternative rendition into English is offered by A.S. Gopani in STP3, p. 136:
Be good to Jainism which is the repository of all heresies and which is the nectar or nectars and
which is easily understood by those desirous of liberation.
211 Maha¯prajn˜a (ViyBh 8.1.1) concludes his own overview of the theoretical debate with the summary
statement that the two doctrines of karmic causality (purus: a¯rtha-va¯da) and natural causality (svabha¯va-
va¯da) are not opposites in Jaina philosophy but integrated through the standpoint of non-one-sidedness
(aneka¯nta-va¯da). This doctrine, one may add, was not yet explicitly formulated in the Prakrit canon, but
only in the philosophical treatises of the medieval period.
212 These are the words of the translators and commentators Sa _nghavı¯ and Dos´ı¯ (1932/1952, p. 171 //
1939/2000, p. 127). Cf. the Vais´es: ika concept of samava¯ya-ka¯ran: a, inherent cause, as one of the sa¯magrı¯,
or totality of causal conditions (Potter 1977/2004, pp. 54f., 60).
213 See Monier-Williams (1899/1986, p. 1157f.), Oberhammer, et al. (2006, pp. 227–229).
214 From the root sam-anv- ﬃp i, ‘‘to go together after, follow, MW.; to infer or ensue as a consequence’’:
‘‘regular succession or order, connected sequence or consequence, conjunction, mutual or immediate
connection’’ (Monier-Williams 1899/1986, p. 1155). In contrast to samava¯ya, samanvaya implies the
concept of an ordered sequence; which tallies well with the Jaina doctrine of standpoints.
215 ‘‘composed probably in the last few centuries BCE’’ (Olivelle 1996/2008, p. xxxvii).
216 ka¯lah: svabha¯vo niyatir yadr:ccha¯, bhu¯ta¯ni yonih: purus:a iti cintyam |
sam: yoga es: a¯m na tv a¯tmabha¯va¯t a¯tma¯ py anı¯s´ah: sukha-duh: khahetoh: ||
(S´vUp1 1.2)
217 The term also appears in STP III.60! (TBV1 III.60, p. 727). On the technical term sam: yoga, ‘‘con-
nection’’, as an attribute of an object which serves as an argument in a syllogism in the Vais´es: ikasu¯tras,
see Oberhammer, et al. (2006, p. 202f.).
218 The position of the jaiccha¯va¯is is mentioned in the Nam: dı¯.
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Or is it a combination of these? But that can’t be, because there is the self
(a¯tman). Even the self is not in control, because it is itself subject to pleasure
and pain (S´vUp2 1.2, Translated by Olivelle 1996/2008, p. 253).
219
Concluding Observations: The Ascetic Body and its Remains
The idea of the transmission of ascetically acquired energy from one individual to
another is well established in all Indic religious traditions.220 Most Jains feel
invigorated when they touch the feet of their gurus while receiving their blessings.
The same applies to their physical remains. The question how this transfer of energy
works is rarely posed both in the Jain tradition and in the academic literature. The
belief in the regenerative powers of relatively durable body parts of animals and
humans especially bones is attested across cultures. It is evidently particularly
significant in hunting societies (Friedrich 1943: 201f. 216f.) but also in the cattle
breading vedic and other societies (Oldenberg 1894/1917: 385f.). In one way or
another the manipulation and interpretation of these material objects has therefore
played a pivotal role in human history albeit in different degrees. P. Granoff (2008:
60) pointed out that not only in Buddhist contexts but already in the Atharvaveda
4.10.7 ‘‘the bones of certain dead individuals had unusual properties and could
naturally transform themselves into something else’’. The idea that bones and other
body parts of extraordinary human and divine beings who died a special death either
through sacrifice or self-mortification ‘‘transform themselves’’ into other objects of
considerable purity and power that appear worthy of veneration (ib. p. 61, 66), for
instance pearls, precious metal, conch shells, etc., is also evident in a wide variety of
Hindu narrative texts which seem intent on testifying ‘‘the continued presence of the
god’’ in his relics (ib. p. 69). The underlying conception seems to be that not human
remains as such, which are considered impure, are powerful and hence worthy or
worship, but secondary objects that were created by these remains themselves in
unexplained ways. Hence there would be two types of relics, in the Buddhist dis-
tinction between ‘‘dirty’’ charred bones (asthi) and ‘‘jewel-like’’ relics (dha¯tu or
s´arı¯ra¯ni) remaining after cremation.
Jaina literature generally does not distinguish between two types of relics and
speaks generally only about asthis in the few texts which deal with relic worship.221
This article has shown that the Jaina theory of transformation offers also conceptual
tools for understanding the distinct power of the bodies and body parts of
extraordinary ascetics compared to those of ordinary human beings or of divine
beings who according to Jaina metaphysics do not possess gross physical bodies.
219 I am grateful to P. S. Jaini, who was the first to point me to this passage.
220 One textual example for this method of transmission of power from a Hindu context will suffice: ‘‘the
person who touches his limbs with the garland that was taken off by Kr:s:n: a is free from all disease and all
sin’’ (Haribhaktivila¯sa 219 cited by Granoff 2008: 69).
221 The word sakaha¯ ‘‘thigh’’ (thigh bone) used for the mythical relics of the Jinas (there are no relics of
the Jinas and hence no corresponding relic cult only a relic cult of subsequent monks and nuns) is worth
while investigating further from a comparative perspective. Cf. Friedrich (1943 ).
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Explanations offered by Jaina mendicants for the transmission and absorption of
such powers vary between the indistinct allusion to the miraculous‘‘powers of be-
lief’’222 and claims of ‘‘physical transformations’’ being effected through contact
‘‘between pudgalas’’.223 For the majority of Jainas, the theology of sacred matter is
however not an issue of great concern, despite the fact that the fetishism of sacred
objects plays a role in Jaina religious life as well, albeit merely a subordinate one.
The prime aim of ascetic practice, they maintain, is the purification of the soul, not
the empowerment of the body; an aim which is explicitly associated with Hindu
asceticism rather than with Jainism.224 It is conceded, however, that the acquisition
of superhuman mental and physical power is an inevitable side-effect of the practice
of asceticism. The use of these powers needs to be renounced.225
222 The Digambara munis Amodhakı¯rti and Amarakı¯rti after going through most of the options of
interpretation including the niks:epa of dravyama _ngala ﬁnally invoked interpretations why relics of
ascetics have no effect on the living: because (1) ‘‘it is nowhere written’’, (2) the ‘‘bones of monks and
householders are the same’’, (3) the ‘‘relics of monks are only touched not eaten (unlike pills)’’, (4)
‘‘there may or may not be a relic under a nisidhi’’, (5) ‘‘the body can be looked at from two
perspectives like a steel vessel containing ghee which can with equal right be labelled ‘steel vessel’ or
‘ghee vessel’’’ (personal communication Mumbaıˆ 1.1.2012).
223 While not touching on the question of relics and reiterating the standard academic narrative of the
suspected presence of metaphysical entities in sacred objects J. Laidlaw (1995: 271) argued that the body
of the Jaina ascetic is perceived as an icon of perfection in a similar way as Jina statues in the templeand
equally worthy of worship:
Reverence for Jain renouncers thus uses the same modes as worship of Jina idols: similar
gestures and texts the same emphasis on visual interaction the same concern with bodily
contact. Like the Jina idol the renouncer then is a presence though attenuated and partial of
the perfect soul. But if idols and renouncers are both in their ways icons of the living Jina
the relations between these two icons are curiously complex (ib.).
224 A classical early Hindu text on the acquisition of superhuman power through ascetic restraint is
Patan˜jali’sYogasu¯tra (YS):
tato’n: ima¯dipra¯durbha¯vah: kayasampattaddharma¯nabhigha¯tas´ca ||46||
ru¯pa-la¯van: ya-bala-vajrasam: hananatva¯ni ka¯yasampat ||47||
Thereform spring up (three perfections i.e.) minute etc. excellence of the body and non-
destruction of the merits of it (46).
The excellence of the body consists of colour loveless strength and adamantine density (YS
3.46f. rendered into English by J. R. Ballantyne and GovindSastry Deva).
On the influence of the YS and of S´aivism and Tantrism on Hemacandra’sYogas´a¯stra (YS´) see Qvarn-
stro¨m 2003: 7 n. 4; 97 n. 2. See also White (1996) and Jacobsen (2012)
225 This sentiment seems to be particularly strong in the orthodox Stha¯nakava¯sı¯ traditions. Considering the
question addressed in this article A¯ca¯rya S´ubhacandra of the Jaymalgacch for instance categorically stated:
‘‘Meditation affects only the soul not the body. The body is not purifiedby meditation only by medicine’’;
‘‘There is no end to the desires of the body and there are no specific physical powers produced by religious
practice’’; ‘‘The only power that is relevant is the strength of the self or a¯tam-bal’’ (personal communi-
cation Jodhpur 2.1.2010). A lay-women assisting Sa¯dhvı¯ Candraka _mta¯ of the Jn˜a¯ngacch asserted: ‘‘Jainism
is not Yoga!’’ The sa¯dhvı¯ agreed and while agreeing that outside matter such as food can be helpful on a
material level added that Jaina practice is not oriented toward the body but primarily aims at strengthening
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